An Overview of Administrative Due Process: Part II by Rogge, O. John
Volume 19 Issue 2 Article 1 
1973 
An Overview of Administrative Due Process: Part II 
O. John Rogge 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional 
Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
O. J. Rogge, An Overview of Administrative Due Process: Part II, 19 Vill. L. Rev. 197 (1973). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
Villanova Law Review
VOLUME 19 DECEMBER 1973 NUMBER 2




[In the initial part of this two-part Article, which appeared
in Issue 1 of Volume 19, the author described the pervasive-
ness of administrative routine in the daily affairs of all
citizens. He discussed the concept of due process as it has
developed in American jurisprudence, and began an analysis
of investigative and adjudicative agency action and the
courts' reaction in identifiable areas. In this concluding part,
Mr. Rogge continues this analysis udith its concomitant
emphasis upon which specific agency determinations may be
challenged, and examines the role of agencies as regulators
and legislators.] - (Editor's Note.)
M. Release on Parole
Probation is granted by the judge at the time of sentencing.
Release from prison on parole, on the other hand, is granted by parole
boards. Although the concepts of due process have long been applied
to probation hearings, they have found little application in the deter-
minations of parole boards.
In general, parole boards do not encourage help from counsel
in determining whether to grant parole, although such action has been
recommended. The travails of another of the writer's clients, David
Greenglass, before the United States Board of Parole, furnishes an
illustration. Mr. Greenglass, one of the defendants in the Rosenberg
case,877 was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for conspiring to
violate the Espionage Act of 1917378 by communicating secret atomic
and other military information to a foreign government during wartime.
* Member of the New York Bar. A.B., University of Illinois, 1922; LL.B.,
Harvard University, 1925; S.J.D., 1931.
377. Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953).
378. 40 Stat. 217 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 22, 50 U.S.C.).
(197)
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Eight times before his mandatory release he was considered for parole.
Seven times the writer went before the United States Board of Parole
with Mr. Greenglass's wife and made a presentation on his behalf.
The .eighth time the writer decided to stay away. In all eight cases
the Board denied parole without furnishing reasons for its action.7 9
Commenting on the denial of parole in the publicized cases of
James R. Hoffa, former head of the Teamsters, and the brothers Philip
and Daniel Berrigan, The New York Times under the caption In-
visible Federal Parole editorialized:
In both cases the Federal Parole Board operated in the dark
and failed to disclose its reasoning. In both cases there has been
more than a hint of political considerations going beyond such
relevant questions as whether or not the prisoners had behaved,
been "rehabilitated," and would be a danger to the community
if freed. The Berrigans and Hoffa were turned down, facts
unknown, but leaving the public with good reason to speculate.
The sequence of events in the Hoffa case indicated that the
Parole Board might indeed release the union leader if he promised
to retire from all official posts in the Teamsters. His resignation
as president cleared the way for the election last month of Frank
E. Fitzsimmons, President Nixon's favorite union chief. In what
had all the external trappings of a deal, the Parole Board
advanced by nearly a year a scheduled review of Hoffa's right to
get out of jail, then pulled a switch and rejected his appeal.
Politics should not have been a factor in granting his attorney's
plea for a special review in Washington or in denying him
freedom, but the facts on both points remain shrouded in the
impenetrable mystery that is the norm in the Federal parole
system.
3 0
The McKay Commission, which investigated the origin and
unfoldings of the 1971 prison riot at Attica, found that prior to the
uprising, parole "had become by far the greatest source of inmate
anxiety and frustration." '' The Commission found that the average
parole hearing lasted 5.9 minutes, during which one board member
decided whether a prisoner would remain incarcerated, possibly for
years, or be released.
379. The writer's experience indicates that the United States Board of Parole
discriminates against individuals like David Greenglass and draft resisters. Charlotte
Reese, a Board member from 1964 to 1970, stated: "There was a tendency to regard
a Jehovah's Witness as a good guy and the guy who burns his draft card as a bad guy."
As quoted in Gunifert, Mosters of Fates, Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 1972, at 1, col. 1;
at 18, cois. 1, 2.
380. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1971, at 28, col. 3.
381. As reported in N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1972, at 24, col. 1.
[VOL. 19: p. 197
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At its seventh plenary session in June 1972, the Administrative
Conference of the United States unanimously approved a recommenda-
tion by its Committee on Informal Action that the United States
Board of Parole issue guidelines under which a prison counselor could
disclose the prisoner's file to the inmate or to his representative in
advance of a parole hearing, except for information which the
sentencing judge had determined should not be disclosed.83 2  The
Conference also recommended that a prisoner be allowed assistance
of counsel, or another representative of his choice, both in the examina-
tion of his file and at his parole interview, although participation in
the latter would be limited to offering remarks at the close of the
interview between the examiner and the prisoner. 8  Finally, with
reference to the parole decision itself, the Conference recommended that
a statement of reasons for deferral or denial of parole be given to the
prisoner in all instances. 84
The issue, whether applicants for parole are entitled to due process
rights, was finally decided by the Fifth Circuit in Scarpa v. United
States Board of Parole."s" After considerable pulling and hauling the
court en banc, by a vote of 12 to 4, concluded: "Due process rights
do not attach at such proceedings."8 8
However, exceptional situations do arise. In Sexton v. United
States8 7 a prisoner was given a certificate of parole on November 7,
1972 advising him that he would be paroled on November 16, 1972.
On November 13, 1972 he was informed, without prior notice or
382. See Administrative Conference, 40 U.S.L.W. 2830, 2831 (U.S. June 20, 1972).
383. Id. at 2831.
384. Id. It should be noted that George J. Reed, former Chairman of the United
States Board of Parole, was quoted in 1972 as saying that the Board was goirg to
begin to give reasons for the denial of parole. However, Chairman Reed also insisted
that parole was a matter of grace, not a statutory or constitutional right. As quoted
in Gumfert, Masters of Fates, Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
385. 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), vacated as moot, 414 U.S. 809 (1973); Scarpa v.
United States Bd. of Parole, 468 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1972); Scarpa v. United States
Bd. of Parole, 453 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1971).
386. 477 F.2d at 283; accord, Bradford v. Weinstein, 357 F. Supp. 1127 (E.D.N.C.
1973); cf. Ganz v. Bensinger, 480 F.2d 88 (7th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Heggie, 362
F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1973) ; Barradale v. United States Bd. of Paroles and Pardons,
362 F. Supp. 338 (M.D. Pa. 1973) ; Stone v. United States Board of Parole, 360 F.
Supp. 22 (D. Md. 1973). In October 1972, under the chairmanship of Maurice H.
Sigler, the United States Board of Parole began an experimental program in five pris-
ons which permitted someone to speak on behalf of a prisoner at his hearing. The pro-
gram was intended to give the prisoner a quick decision and, more importantly, a full
explanation if parole is denied. Mr. Sigler permitted Robert Wool, a member of the
staff of the New York Times Magazine, to attend two days of sessions between pris-
oners and two Board members in April 1973 at Lewisburg Penitentiary. Mr. Wool
quoted Mr. Sigler as saying: "We have this terrible power. We sit up here playing
God." Wool, The New Parole and the Case of Mr. Simms, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1973,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 14, 21, cob. 2. In September 1973, effective October 1, 1973, the
Board of Parole established for its Northeast Region (Region 1) a hearing and
appellate procedure for release on parole. 38 Fed. Reg. 26652-57 (Sept. 24, 1973).
387. 352 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
DECEMBER 1973]
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hearing, that this decision had been reversed. The district court held
that to be a violation of due process, and stated:
A prospective parolee who has been approved for parole
enjoys a status as important as those suffering economic depriva-
tion and is entitled to minimal due process safeguards before
rescission of his parole. The Supreme Court has decided that
probationers and parolees are entitled to due process at revocation
hearings. Upon due process and equal protection grounds, it is
inconsistent and unfair to deny Sexton the right of minimal due
process before the Board acts on rescission of the parole.. 8
In Sobell v. Reed.89 the district court held that the United States
Board of Parole had embarked upon an unconstitutional course of
action when it attempted to limit and restrict a parolee's first amend-
ment rights to speak, assemble with others and otherwise express his
views. The parolee, Morton Sobell, another of the defendants in
Rosenberg v. United States... was denied permission to participate
in demonstrations against the Vietnam war and to speak on prison
conditions at a banquet sponsored by People's World, a newspaper
which, for the purposes of the suit, was stipulated as closely identified
with the Communist Party. Judge Frankel invited Chairman Reed,
or any of his colleagues, to appear before him to testifiy, but the
Chairman declined. Thereafter, Judge Frankel ruled for the plaintiff,
stating:
But it is urged that the Board's action is outside the court's
power of review. It would be surprising, and gravely questionable,
if Congress had meant to confer such final authority upon any
administrative agency, particularly one that makes no pretense
to learning in constitutional law. It would be bizarre to hold,
as the Government's position ultimately entails, that assertions of
constitutional rights like those made here may be overridden
without ever being faced and decided by any tribunal of any
kind. But there is no occasion to become upset over such impli-
cations. The Government's position is not soundly baseda 9'
Not all jurisdictions follow the premise that due process rights
are not applicable to parole proceedings. In 1971 the New Jersey
388. Id. at 149 (citations omitted). See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
In a similar situation, Daniel Hamm, a prisoner at the Auburn Correctional Facility,
Auburn, New York, was told on October 13, 1973, that he had been granted parole,
and then advised on December 1, 1973, without notice or a hearing, that the Board
of Parole had rescinded his parole on the basis of new information. See Markham,
Parole is Granted but Then Revoked for a 'Harlem Six' Inmate, N.Y. Times, Mar.
6, 1973, at 45, col. 4.
389. 327 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
390. 346 U.S. 273 (1953).
391 327 F. Supp. at 1301-02.
200 [VOL. 19: p. 197
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Supreme Court held that a State Parole Board's rule which precluded
the statement of reasons for parole denial should be replaced by "a
carefully prepared rule designed generally towards affording statements
of reasons on parole denial.
'3 9
1
N. Revocation of Probation or Parole
The responsibility for the revocation of probation lies within the
judiciary and the responsibility for revocation of parole is vested in
parole boards. Parole revocation is an administrative act; probation
revocation partakes of the nature of an administrative act. The Ameri-
can Correctional Association has stated:
To an even greater extent than in the case of imprisonment,
probation and parole practice is determined by an administrative
discretion that is largely uncontrolled by legal standards, pro-
tections, or remedies. Until statutory and case law are more fully
developed, it is vitally important within all of the correctional
fields that there should be established and maintained reasonable
norms and remedies against the sorts of abuses that are likely to
develop where men have great power over their fellows and
where relationships may become both mechanical and arbitrary.
93
The courts recently have recognized the problem and have applied
due process concepts to the revocation of probation or parole. In
Mempa v. Rhay,394 the Supreme Court decided that an individual
was entitled to counsel at Washington State's unusual probation revo-
cation and deferred sentencing proceedings, and in McConnell v.
Rhay 95 the Court applied Mempa retroactively.
392. Monke v. New Jersey State Bd. of Parole, 58 N.J. 238, 249, 277 A.2d 193,
199 (1971). In Application of Cummings, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 17, 1973, at 1, col. 3 (N.Y.
S. Ct. Albany County), the court ordered the State Board of Parole to make available
to inmates whose applications for parole had been rejected the reasons for their denial.
Cf. Masiello v. Norton, __ F. Supp. - (D. Conn. 1973), wherein the court held
that a federal inmate whose parole application was denied on the basis of an "organized
crime" designation on his file was entitled to an opportunity to contest the allegations
and information underlying that designation. But cf. Taliferro v. New Jersey Parole
Bd., 460 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1972).
The denial in December 1973 for a second year in a row of executive clemency
for Mark Fein, who was convicted of murdering his bookmaker, People v. Fein, 18
N.Y.2d 162, 272 N.Y.S.2d 753, 219 N.E.2d 274 (1966), suggests another area for the
application of due process concepts - that of the denial of executive clemency. But
in Bates v. Nelson, 485 F.2d 90, 96 (9th Cir. 1973), the Ninth Circuit stated: "We
know of no authority which we possess, and none has been revealed to us, by which we
may review acts of executive clemency." Cf. Schick v. Reed, 483 F.2d 1266 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (presidential "no parole" condition attached to a commutation not reviewable).
393. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS
279 (3d ed. 1966), quoted approzngly in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 500
n.13 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
394. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
395. 393 U.S. 2 (1968).
DECEMBER 1973]
5
Rogge: An Overview of Administrative Due Process: Part II
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
In Morrissey v. Brewer8 96 the Court dealt with Iowa Board of
Parole revocations of parole in the absence of a hearing. The Court,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, presented a guide to the due
process requirements in proceedings for the revocation of parole. The
Court concluded that although parolees did not have the full panoply of
rights due a defendant in a criminal prosecution, they did have certain
due process rights, including the right to a preliminary hearing after
arrest. The Court's view was that "due process requires that after the
arrest, the determination that reasonable ground exists for revocation
of parole should be made by someone not directly involved in the
case." ' 7  Thereafter, the Court laid down requirements for the
preliminary hearing:
With respect to the preliminary hearing . . . the parolee
should be given notice that the hearing will take place and that
its purpose is to determine whether there is probable cause to
believe he has committed a parole violation. The notice should
state what parole violations have been alleged. At the hearing
the parolee may appear and speak in his own behalf; he may bring
letters, documents, or individuals who can give relevant informa-
tion to the hearing officer. On request of the parolee, persons
who have given adverse information on which parole revocation
is to be based are to be made available for questioning in his
presence. However, if the hearing officer determines that the
informant would be subjected to risk of harm if his identity were
disclosed, he need not be subjected to confrontation and cross-
examination.
The hearing officer shall have the duty of making a summary,
or digest, of what occurs at the hearing in terms of the responses
of the parolee and the substance of the documents or evidence
given in support of parole revocation and of the parolee's position.
Based on the information before him, the officer should determine
whether there is probable cause to hold the parolee for the final
decision of the parole board on revocation. Such a determination
would be sufficient to warrant the parolee's continued detention
and return to the state correctional institution pending the final
decision. As in Goldberg, "the decision maker should state the
reasons for his determination and indicate the evidence he relied
on . . ." but it should be remembered that this is not a final deter-
mination calling for "formal findings of fact and conclusions of
law." No interest would be served by formalism in this process;
informality will not lessen the utility of this inquiry in reducing
the risk of error. 89
396. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
397. Id. at 485.
398. Id. at 486-87 (citation omitted).
[VOL. 19 : p. 197
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One will note the exception from disclosure of the ever present con-
fidential informant.
For the revocation hearing itself, the Court set forth six minimum
requirements of due process:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole;
(b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him;
(c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present wit-
nesses and documentary evidence;
(d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for
not allowing confrontation) ;
(e) a "neutral and detached" hearing body such as a tra-
ditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial
officers or lawyers; and
(f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence
relied on and reasons for revoking parole. We emphasize there
is no thought to equate this second stage of parole revocation
to a criminal prosecution in any sense. It is a narrow inquiry;
the process should be flexible enough to consider evidence in-
cluding letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be
admissible in an adversary criminal trial. 3°9
The Court expressly left open the question of whether due process
entitled a parolee to the assistance of counsel."° The Second Circuit,
however, in United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Board of
Parole4. extended Mempa's grant of the right to counsel at the time
probation is revoked to an individual involved in a parole revocation
proceeding, and the New York Court of Appeals in People ex rel.
Menechino v. Warden"2 has done likewise. On the other hand, the
Fourth Circuit, in a four-to-three decision in Bearden v. South
Carolina,4"' has adopted the empirical case-by-case fundamental fair-
ness approach of Betts v. Brady404 on the right to counsel in parole
399. Id. at 489.
400. Id. But compare Chief Justice Burger in Morrissey with Circuit Judge
Burger in Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
401. 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), judgment vacated and case remanded with directionwt
to dismiss as moot, 404 U.S. 879 (1971).
402. 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971).
403. 443 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 US. 972 (1972).
404. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). The court recognized that the Betts doctrine was not
without its flaws:
We presently adopt the empirical rule of [Betts] fully aware that in adopt-
ing a case-by-case approach articulation of where the line should be drawn
between those who should have been supplied with counsel and those lawfully
refused such assistance is a most difficult undertaking. That Betts proved un-
workable after 21 years of experimentation does not mean, we think, that its
DECEMBER 1973]
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revocation hearings. Judge Craven, writing for the majority, stated:
"We hold that the Sixth Amendment and the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment do not require the states in every case to
afford counsel to indigent parolees."45
Judge Winter, joined by Judges Sobeloff and Butzner, dissented
from the majority's decision insofar as it held that the sixth and
fourteenth amendments did not guarantee the right to counsel at parole
revocation hearings. In his view, "[t]he basic error in the majority's
opinion [was] its niggardly reading of Mempa v. Rhay."'40
The question of the right to counsel in probation revocation
proceedings was recently before the Supreme Court in Gagnon v.
Scarpelli. °  The case involved a Wisconsin statute which provided
that persons placed on probation, except those in Milwaukee, be placed
in the custody of the state's Department of Health and Social Services;
the Department, rather than the court, had the power to revoke pro-
bation.4"' The Seventh Circuit had held that although probation hear-
ings could be administrative rather than judicial, probationers were
entitled to have either retained or appointed counsel to assist them at
hearings on probation revocation. 4 9 The Supreme Court first ruled,
a fortiori, on the basis of Morrissey v. Brewer41 that a probationer in
a proceeding for the revocation of probation had the same due process
rights as a parolee in a proceeding for the revocation of parole.41'
However, on the right to appointed counsel, the Court took the em-
pirical case-by-case fundamental fairness due process approach, saying
through Justice Powell:
We thus find no justification for a new inflexible constitutional
rule with respect to the requirement of counsel. We think, rather.
that the decision as to the need for counsel must be made on a
case-by-case basis in the exercise of a sound discretion by the
state authority charged with responsibility for administering the
rationale cannot be reasonably satisfactory in the administrative as opposed to
the judicial context.
443 F.2d at 1095 (citations omitted). Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
405. 443 F.2d at 1093.
406. Id. at 1096 (Winter, J., dissenting). Somewhat earlier in Hewett v. North
Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969), a panel of the Fourth Circuit held that
Mempa required counsel at probation revocation hearings. Nevertheless, the majority
in Bearden felt free to say that in rejecting the "contention that every parolee faced
with the possibility of revocation has an absolute right to the assistance of counsel,
we do not reject or undermine our decision in Hewett." 443 F.2d at 1094. The writer
finds it difficult to accept this statement.
407. 411 U.S. 778 (1973). For an account of the argument before the Court, see
41 U.S.L.W. 3386-87 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1973).
408. WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 973.09, 973.10 (Supp. 1973).
409. 454 F.2d at 421.
410. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). See notes 366-68 and accompanying text supra.
411. 411 U.S. at 782.
[VOL. 19 : p. 197
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probation and parole system. Although the presence and par-
ticipation of counsel will probably be both undesirable and consti-
tutionally unnecessary in most revocation hearings there will re-
main certain cases in which fundamental fairness - the touch-
stone of due process - will require that the State provide at its
expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees.41
0. Treatment of Prisoners
There was a time not too long ago when courts were hesitant and
reluctant to interfere with prison discipline, leaving such matters wholly
to the unsupervised discretion of prison officials and guards. Gradually
the federal courts began to give relief where such treatment was demon-
strably unwarranted and unnecessarily cruel. In Jackson v. Bishop,4 ' 3
the Eighth Circuit, in an opinion by Circuit Judge, now Justice
Blackmun, granted injunctive relief restraining the personnel of the
Arkansas State Penitentiary system from inflicting corporal punish-
ment, including the use of the strap, as a disciplinary measure. Although
the court based its opinion on the ground that the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment made the eighth amendment applicable to
the states, the court also considered the fundamental fairness, case-by-
case application of the due process clause:
With these principles and guidelines before us, we have'no diffi-
culty in reaching the conclusion that the use of the strap in the
penitentiaries of Arkansas is punishment which, in this last third
of the 20th century, runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment; that
the strap's use, irrespective of any precautionary conditions which
may be imposed, offends contemporary concepts of decency and
human dignity and precepts of civilization which we profess to
possess; and that it also violates those standards of good conscience
and fundamental fairness enunciated by this court in the Carey
and Lee cases.414
412. Id. at 790. In California Adult Authority v. Griffin, 412 U.S. 916 (1973),
vacating and remanding 464 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1972), rehearing denied, 412 U.S. 963(1973), and M'Clary v. California Adult Authority, 412 U.S. 916 (1973), vacating
and remanding 466 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1972), rehearing denied, 412 U.S.. 963 (1973),the Court vacated and remanded cases to the Ninth Circuit for consideration ofwhether to apply Morrissey retroactively in the light of Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778 (1973).
In Zizzo v. United States, 470 F.2d 105 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.1012 (1972), the Seventh Circuit refused to apply Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.471 (1972), retroactively to a revocation of parole hearing held prior to the date
Morrissey was announced. The parolee in that instance was held to be in violationof one of the conditions of his parole in that he frequently associated with an individual
with a well established reputation as a hoodlum.
For other recent cases dealing with the due process rights of probationers
and parolees, see Appendix IV infra.
413. 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
414. Id. at 579.
DECEMBER 1973]
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In Wright v. McMann415 the Second Circuit held that allegations
in a complaint under the Civil Rights Act,41 concerning conditions in
a solitary confinement cell in New York's Clinton State Prison stated
a cause of action by reason of the eighth and fourteenth amendments:
The subhuman conditions alleged by Wright to exist in the "strip
cell" at Dannemora could only serve to destroy completely the
spirit and undermine the sanity of the prisoner. The Eighth
Amendment forbids treatment so foul, so inhuman and so violative
of basic concepts of decency.41
In the past five years there have been numerous cases involving
the due process rights of prisoners. In Sostre v. Rockefeller,418 the
district court enjoined prison officials from returning the plaintiff
prisoner to punitive segregation for charges previously preferred
against him, awarded the plaintiff punitive as well as compensatory
damages, and further enjoined the defendant prison officials:
from placing plaintiff in punitive segregation or subjecting him
to any other punishment as a result of which he loses accrued
good time credit or is unable to earn good time credit, without:
1) Giving him, in advance of a hearing, a written copy of
any charges made against him, citing the written rule or regula-
tion which it is charged he has violated;
2) Granting him a recorded hearing before a disinterested
official where he will be entitled to cross-examine his accusers
and to call witnesses on his own behalf;
3) Granting him the right to retain counsel or to appoint a
counsel substitute;
4) Giving him, in writing, the decision of the hearing officer
in which is briefly set forth the evidence upon which it is based,
the reasons for the decision, and the legal basis for the punishment
imposed.419
415. 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967), rev'g 257 F. Supp. 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1966).
416. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3) (1970).
417. Id. at 526. When the case was returned to the court below, the district
court, after seven days of trial and 1,566 pages plus exhibits of record, ruled in favor
of Wright and another prisoner, and awarded damages to Wright. Wright v. McMann,
321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
418. 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part, modified in part, aff'd in
part sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 978 (1972). See Lubasch, Court Extends Convicts' Rights, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25,
1971, at 1, col. 8.
419. 312 F. Supp. at 884. Earlier the district court had issued a temporary re-
straining order followed by a preliminary injunction. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 309 F.
Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
[VOL. 19: p. 197
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Although the Second Circuit reversed the district court's order which
required prison officials to adhere to numerous trial type procedures
when punishing prisoners, it nevertheless stated:
We do not thereby imply that dicipline in New York prisons may
be administered arbitrarily or capriciously. We would not lightly
condone the absence of such basic safeguards against arbitrariness
as adequate notice, an opportunity for the prisoner to reply to
charges lodged against him, and a reasonable investigation into
the relevant facts - at least in cases of substantial discipline. 2 °
The Second Circuit also reversed insofar as the district court had
enjoined non-arbitrary restraint of communication between the prisoner
and his co-defendant, but nevertheless held:
The refusal to mail Sostre's letter to the Post Office Inspector,
complaining of prison practices, clearly infringed Sostre's Four-
teenth Amendment rights. We also affirm [the district court's]
order insofar as it enjoins defendants Follette and McGinnis,
their employees, agents, successors, and all persons in active
concert and participation with them, from deleting material from,
refusing to mail or refusing to give to Sostre: (1) Any com-
munication between Sostre and the following - (a) any court;
(b) any public official or agency; or (c) any lawyer - with re-
spect to either his criminal conviction or any complaint he may
have concerning the administration of the prison where he is
incarcerated.1
21
The courts, in various situations, have applied certain due process
limitations to the imposition of disciplinary measures by prison officials.
When Angela Davis was held in the New York City Women's House
of Detention pending the outcome of extradition proceedings brought
by the state of California, she was held in solitary facilities, separate
and apart from the general inmate population. She petitioned the
federal district court and obtained injunctive relief "to the extent of
requiring that she be housed with the general inmate population and
afforded all privileges enjoyed by them.
'422
In Nolan v. Scafati,42 a state prisoner sent a letter to the federal
district court complaining that he was sent to solitary confinement
without the right to cross-examine the complaining guard, to call his
own witnesses, or to have counsel present. Additionally, he claimed
that prison officials had refused to mail his letter to the Massachusetts
420. 442 F.2d at 203.
421. Id. The court did affirm the award of compensatory damages against
the warden.
422. Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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Civil Liberties Union seeking advice and assistance on his due process
claim. The district court dismissed his complaint and, with reference
to the claim to rights at a disciplinary hearing, stated: "So far as
this Court knows, this issue has not been adjudicated heretofore."
4 24
The First Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case. With
reference to the prisoner's claimed due process rights at a disciplinary
hearing, the court stated:
While all the procedural safeguards provided citizens charged with
a crime obviously cannot and need not be provided to prison
inmates charged with violation of a prison disciplinary rule, some
assurances of elemental fairness are essential when substantial
individual interests are at stake. 25
As to the prisoner's claimed right of access to the courts and to
correspond with the Civil Liberties Union, the court added:
That a state prison inmate has a right of access to the courts
was first enunciated in Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941),
wherein the Court stated that "the state and its officers may not
abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply to a federal court
for a writ of habeas corpus." In order that this right be assured
all inmates, the Court recently held that a state could not prevent
one inmate from assisting another inmate in the preparation of
his writ. The underlying rationale was that access to the courts
is effectively denied unless the inmate can obtain some such legal
assistance.
That prison inmates do not have all the constitutional rights of
citizens in society - and may hold some constitutional rights in
diluted form - does not permit prison officials to frustrate vindi-
cation of those rights which are enjoyed by inmates, or to be
the sole judge - by refusal to mail letters to counsel - to
determine which letters assert constitutional rights. 26
Inmates at the state correctional institution in Pittsburgh pub-
lished a prison newsletter called Vibrations. In April 1971, relations
between the Vibrations staff and the prison administration deteriorated
markedly and the newsletter was shut down. Plaintiffs sought relief
in federal district court alleging that they were transferred to other
prisons, placed in punitive and administrative segregation, suspended
from their jobs, subjected to physical and verbal abuse, and had their
424. 306 F. Supp. at 2.
425. 430 F.2d at 550.
426. Id. at 551 (citations omitted).
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personal belongings confiscated.427 The district court dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. 2' The Third Circuit reversed, stating:
It is, of course, clear beyond doubt that a state prison inmate
continues to receive the protection of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . We do not consider it appro-
priate, on review . . . of a motion to dismiss . . . to suggest
what may be the precise requirements of the due process clause
in this case. . . . But we do hold that the transfer of a prisoner
from the general prison population to solitary confinement without
either notice of the charges or a hearing does not, absent unusual
circumstances not evident in the pleadings, meet minimal due
process requirements.429
Rankin v. Wainright,4"' dealt with an inmate at the Florida State
Prison who had been tried for the offense of escape and found not
guilty. Nevertheless, at the prison he was placed in solitary confine-
ment as punishment for his alleged escape and deprived of 999 days
of accrued good behavior "gain time." The district court held such
punishment could not be imposed without an administrative hearing,
at which time the petitioner would be entitled to:
(a) written notice of the alleged escape; (b) disclosure to peti-
tioner of evidence against him; (c) an opportunity to be heard
in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence;
(d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses; (e) a neutral and detached hearing body; (f) unqualified
access to legal materials, within the prison, in preparation of his
defense; and (g) a written statement by the fact finders as to
the evidence relied on and the reasons for forfeiting petitioner's
gain time, if the hearing body does in fact find that petitioner
escaped from prison."3'
In a widely cited case, Clutchette v. Procunier,12 the district court
concluded that certain disciplinary procedures at San Quentin Prison
violated the due process as well as equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment:
Plaintiffs are hereby granted a declaratory judgment with
respect to their first cause of action insofar as this opinion and
427. Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179, 183 (3d Cir. 1972).
428. 329 F. Supp. 418 (W.D, Pa. 1971).
429. 465 F.2d at 184-85. In United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp.
939 (E.D. Pa. 1973), the court refused to apply Gray retroactively as to money dam-
ages but was of a different view for the purposes of equitable relief such as orders for
reinstatement of good time credit lost in solitary confinement and expungement.
430. 351 F. Supp. 1306 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
431. Id. at 1307.
432. 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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order declare that the disciplinary procedures employed at San
Quentin Prison violate the due process and equal protection clauses
of the 14th amendment by failing to provide for adequate notice
of charges, the calling of favorable witnesses and cross-examina-
tion of accusing witnesses, counsel or counsel-substitute, a decision
by a fact-finder uninvolved with the alleged incident, a written
finding of facts, or uniform notice of any right to appeal the
decision, when . . . a disciplinary hearing may result in grievous
loss to the prisoner; and that certain disciplinary punishment,
including but not necessarily limited to (a) indefinite confinement
in the adjustment center or segregation; (b) possible increase
in a prisoner's sentence by reason of referral of the disciplinary
action to the Adult Authority; (c) a fine or forfeiture of accumu-
lated or future earnings; (d) isolation confinement longer than 10
days; or (e) referral to the district attorney for criminal prose-
cution, constitute . . . a grievous loss to the prisoner ... 433
In United States ex rel. Robinson v. Mancusi,43 4 the district
court held that before the prisoner concerned could be denied mess
hall and work privileges typically afforded inmates of the general
prison population he had to be granted a hearing, and ordered that the
hearing take place within 72 hours of the filing of its decision. The
court considered it settled that due process required, at a minimum,
that the prisoner be confronted with the accusation against him, in-
formed of the evidence, and afforded a reasonable opportunity to
explain his actions.435
In the highly charged atmosphere of tension prevailing in the
aftermath of the Attica uprising, the Rhode Island Adult Correctional
Institution transferred 11 inmates to federal and state prisons through-
out the country. The district court, in Gomes v. Travisono,46 held
that, while the transfers in and of themselves were not cruel and unusual
punishment in the constitutional sense, the procedures and practices
under which they were effectuated violated due process.43 7 The court
ordered that no prisoner be transferred to a prison in another state
unless:
Prior to transfer (absent an emergency situation or compelling
state interest), the inmate is given written notice of the charge
or reasons for transfer; this charge or reason is investigated and
reviewed by a superior officer; a hearing on the question of
transfer is held before an impartial board; administrative review
of the charge is available; and a record of the proceeding is kept.
433. Id. at 784-85.
434. 340 F. Supp. 662 (W.D.N.Y. 1972).
435. Id. at 663.
436. 353 F. Supp. 457 (D.R.I.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, ____ F.2d ____ (1st
Cir. 1973).
437. Id. at 465.
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At the hearing the: inmate must be read the charge and given the
opportunity to respond, which opportunity shall include the right
to call and examine witnesses and to have the assistance of a
lay advocate. The decision to transfer must be based on substantial
evidence. 38
Prisoners' rights of access to counsel, the law library, and the
courts have also been the subjects of due process protection. In Gilmore
v. Lynch 9 a three-judge federal district court held invalid California
prison regulations limiting law books in prison libraries to federal and
state constitutions, certain codes, a law dictionary, a work on state
criminal procedure, a digest, and certain rules of court - but excluding
state and federal reports and annotated codes - on the ground that
such limitations denied prisoners reasonable access to the courts. In
Cross v. Powers,44 ° the district court invalidated, as violative of due
process, a Wisconsin prison regulation that prohibited a prisoner from
"taking materials, including legal papers, to prison areas shared com-
monly with other inmates; passing legal papers to other inmates; from
working on other inmates' legal problems; and from preparing legal
papers, petitions, and documents on behalf of, or jointly with, other
inmates."
441
Another area in which the courts have acted to place restrictions
on prison administrative policy has been censorship of a prisoner's
mail. In Smith v. Robbins442 the district court held that an inmate
was entitled to be present when a prison official inspected incoming
mail from the inmate's attorney for contraband. The First Circuit,
in affirming that part of the district court's decision, reasoned:
However strongly the warden may feel about a possible
indignity to the prison administration in a suggestion by the
court that it is not to be trusted not to read the letter, this
438. Id. at 472. After hearing the testimony, which included that of a guard who
served as an advisor to the Afro-American Society and a sociologist who had studied
race relations at the prison, the court expressed doubt as to whether the warden
actually believed there even was a conspiracy which threatened the prison.
In another recent transfer case, Capitan v. Cupp, 356 F. Supp. 302 (D. Ore.
1972), the court held that the prisoner was entitled to a hearing on the charges which
led to his transfer, saying: "I am satisfied that the transfer of a prisoner from a state
institution to a federal prison 2,000 miles from his family and his home is a 'grievous
loss' which requires the imposition of some procedural safeguards." Id. at 303.
For other cases involving the due process rights of prisoners, see AppendixV infra.
439. 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Younger v.
Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971). Previously in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969),
the Court had sanctioned the practice of prisoners acting as "jailhouse" lawyers.
440. 328 F. Supp. 899 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
441. Id. at 900.
For other recent cases which deal with a prisoner's right of access to counsel,
to an adequate law library, or to the courts, see Appendix VI infra.
442. 454 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1972), aff'g in part, 328 F. Supp. 162 (D. Me. 1971).
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misses the point. The court does not suggest that the warden is
untrustworthy. Rather, it is that a prisoner, and possibly some
attorneys, may feel, if only to a small degree, that someone in
the chain of command may not be trusted, and that the resulting
fear may chill communications between the prisoner and his
counsel. . . . [W]e see no reason to leave such possible appre-
hensions on such an important matter as right to counsel in the
minds of the prisoner or his attorney."'
In LeVier v. Woodson4. a state prisoner in Colorado went to
the federal district court with the claim that under the first and four-
teenth amendments he had the right to have prison officials forward
his correspondence, complaining about prison conditions and seeking
an investigation, to the Governor, the state's Attorney General, and
the state's Pardon Attorney. The trial judge concluded that the
prisoner did not have such a right. The Tenth Circuit, however, dis-
agreed, and held that such correspondence from a prisoner to appro-
priate officials was constitutionally protected. 45
The First Circuit, in Nolan v. Fitzpatrick,446 directed the district
court to enter a judgment declaring that the plaintiffs had a right
to send letters to the press concerning prison management, treatment
of offenders, and personal grievances unless the letters contained or
concerned contraband, plans of escape, or devices for evading prison
regulations.
447
A federal three-judge district court in Martinez v. Procunier"s
enjoined both the enforcement of the regulations of the California
Department of Corrections insofar as they pertained to inmate mail
and of an administrative rule of the Department that limited inter-
views with inmates to licensed investigators or members of the bar.
The mail regulations were based on the premise that the use of the
mails was a privilege, not a right.449 The court, however, recognized
a prisoner's right to correspond as fundamental, protected by the first
amendment. 50
443. 454 F.2d at 697. In Meola v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1971),
the district court commented: "The fact that prisoners may exaggerate about prison
conditions and make false allegations against prison officials cannot justify prison
review and censorship of the contents of an inmate's correspondence with the courts."
Id. at 885.
444. 443 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1971).
445. Id. at 361.
446. 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971), reilg and remanding 326 F. Supp. 209
(D. Mass.).
447. Id. at 551.
448. 354 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Cal.), probable jurisdiction noted, 412 U.S. 948
(1973).
449. Id. at 1095.
450. Id. at 1097.
In Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wis. 1972), rev'd,
F.2d ---- (7th Cir. 1973), the district court held that a prisoner was entitled to carry
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If prisoners are to be allowed to communicate with newsmen,
then the next logical step would be to give prisoners the right, subject
to suitable conditions, to receive newsmen as visitors. The court took
that step in Burnham v. Oswald:45
[T]he right of an inmate to send letters to the press survives
incarceration. . . To say that inmates have the right to corre-
spond necessarily means that, with suitable regulation, they must
also have the right to have newsmen visitors. There are many
inmates who would be deprived of their right to communicate if
they could only correspond but not meet personally with newsmen.
Further, there are many prison situations which can only be
explored fully and accurately by a face-to-face interview.
452
In Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst4 53 Federal District Judge Gesell
held the Federal Bureau of Prisons practice of prohibiting press inter-
views with individual inmates invalid as violative of the first amend-
ment. He declared:
[U]nder the First Amendment, subject to reasonable restrictions
as to time and place, the press has a right to access to interview
on an amorous correspondence with his sister-in-law. The judge reasoned that a
prisoner had the same right to the use of the mail as a member of the general popu-
lation. The Seventh Circuit reversed.
In Adams v. Carlson, 352 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Ill. 1973), the court stated:
[O]nce it is established that the intended recipient of a letter is a proper person
to correspond with the inmate, and that the letter's contents do not fall within
the possible justifications for censoring, then it follows that it is clearly imper-
missible for the defendants to withhold such letters merely because they do not
like or believe what is stated therein. A central function of the First Amend-
ment is to permit unfettered communications of grievances, real or imagined.
Id. at 896.
In Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970), the district court
issued a temporary restraining order, pending a hearing before a three-judge court on
first amendment grounds barring censorship of the mail of inmates awaiting trial.
Probably inspired in part by Palmigiano, the imprisoned Berrigan brothers,
Philip and Daniel, brought a class action in the federal district court in Hartford,
Connecticut, on behalf of themselves and other federal prisoners seeking the right to
preach, teach, and write freely as guaranteed by the first amendment. Their motion
for a preliminary injunction was denied. Berrigan v. Norton, 322 F. Supp. 46 (D.
Conn. 1971).
In Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the court
enjoined prison officials from disciplining inmates "because of statements in letters to
persons outside prison walls unless such letters present a clear and present danger
of disrupting prison security or some other justifiable purpose of imprisonment."
Id. at 1030.
In Worley v. Bounds, 355 F. Supp. 115 (W.D.N.C. 1973), the court held
that the refusal to permit a black inmate to write to the white unmarried mother of
his own child was unconstitutional discrimination.
Recently the American Civil Liberties Union brought a class action in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking to remove all
restrictions on prisoner mail. See N.Y. Times, June 2, 1973, at 29, col. 5.
See generally Singer, Censorship of Prisoners' Mail and the Constitution,
56 A.B.A.J. 1051 (1970).
451. 342 F. Supp. 880 (W.D.N.Y. 1972).
452. Id. at 779.
453. 357 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C.), stay granted, 406 U.S. 912, remanded with
directions, 477 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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confidentially and without censorship any inmate of a federal cor-
rectional institution who consents to be interviewed, except where
it is determined that serious administrative or disciplinary prob-
lems are likely to result from the particular interview sought. .... "
The Supreme Court granted a stay,455 and the District of Columbia
Circuit remanded for additional evidentiary hearings.45 Judge Gesell
held the additional hearings which reinforced his previous views both
as to the law and the facts.45 '
Similarly, the courts have protected the rights of prisoners to
receive publications of their choice. For example, in Jackson v.
Godwin"" a black prisoner claimed that state prison rules and regula-
tions deprived him of equal protection of the law by denying him the
right to receive black publications, while permitting white inmates to
receive white newspapers and magazines. The district court denied
relief. The Fifth Circuit, however, agreed that he was deprived not
only of his fourteenth amendment right to equal protection, but also
to his first amendment freedoms (on the assumption, of course, that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment made the first
amendment fully applicable to the states). Senior Circuit Judge Tuttle,
writing for the court, stated:
It is also clear that the prison officials have not met the heavy
burden of justifying either the resulting racial discrimination or
the resulting curtailment of petitioner's First Amendment free-
doms and denial of the equal enjoyment of rights and privileges
afforded other, and white, prisoners. 59
In Brown v. Peyton46 the plaintiff, an inmate of the Virginia
State Prison who professed adherence to the Islamic, or Black Muslim,
454. 357 F. Supp. at 779; accord, Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Kleindienst,
364 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Tex. 1973) ("When all is said and done, what remains is a
case of prior restriction on the press' right to publish, the prisoner's right to speak
out, and the public's right to know." Id. at 730.)
455. 406 U.S. 912 (1972).
456. 477 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
457. 357 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1972).
458. 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968).
459. Id. at 535.
460. 437 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971).
In Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964), rev'g 324 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1963),
the Court held that a prisoner's complaint alleging he was denied permission to pur-
chase certain religious publications and denied other privileges enjoyed by other
prisoners solely because of his religious beliefs, stated a cause of action. On remand,
the district court enjoined prison officials from denying the petitioner and other Black
Muslim prisoners the right to communicate and visit with ministers of their faith
and the right to attend religious services conducted by them. The Seventh Circuit
affirmed. 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967).
For other recent cases, pro and con, involving the right of prison inmates to
receive publications of their choice, see, e.g., Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266
(9th Cir. 1971) (seven copies of Muhammed Speaks) ; Horn v. California, 436 F.2d
1375 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'g 321 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Cal. 1968) (Black Muslim publi-
cations); Knuckles v. Prasse, 435 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
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faith, filed a complaint against prison officials alleging that he had
been denied permission to subscribe to the Muslim newspaper Muham-
mad Speaks, to purchase the book Message to the Blackman in America
by Elijah Muhammad, to order an Arabic dictionary and grammar,
and to hold prayer meetings with other members of his faith. The
district court dismissed the complaint without a hearing. The Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded for a
plenary hearing.
The courts have also responded to protect prisoners in the free
exercise of the religion of their choice. In the past few years these
rulings have largely involved Black Muslims. For example, in Pitts v.
Knowles,46 the district court enjoined Wisconsin officials from con-
tinuing the practice of permitting use of the Koran on a more limited
basis than that of the sacred texts of other religions.4 62 No sooner
had prison officials adjusted to the legal decisions favoring the free
exercise of the Black Muslim faith, than they found themselves dead-
locked with a new militant religious group composed of young white
inmates who called themselves the Church of the New Song. This
sect is comprised of about 400 members in at least four federal prisons
who preach a kind of social mysticism. The sect's doctrine centers on
self-affirmation and self-celebration through union with "Eclat," the
936, rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 877 (1971) (Black Muslim publications in the hands
of inmates not fully informed of the Muslim doctrine could constitute a clear and
present danger of breach of prison security or discipline) ; Sostre v. Otis, 330 F. Supp.
941 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Black Muslim and other publications) ("We agree and for
the reasons expressed in Carothers we believe that a prisoner is entitled as a matter
of constitutional right to rudimentary due process under prison conditions including
(1) notice; (2) some opportunity to object (either personally or in writing) ; and
(3) a decision by a body that can be expected to act fairly." Id. at 946) ; Rowland
v. Sigler, 327 F. Supp. 821 (D. Neb.), aff'd, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971) ("A
study by this court of the copies of Muhammed Speaks in evidence results in a
finding that those copies do not contain any direct incitement to physical violence
within the meaning of Chapinsky [sic] v. New Hampshire . . . or any other form of
clear and present danger within the meaning of Dennis v. United States." Id. at
827); Payne v. Whitmore, 325 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (newspapers and
magazines) ; Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(Fortune News).
461. 339 F. Supp. 1183 (W.D. Wis. 1972).
462. Id. at 1186.
For other recent cases involving the practice of their religion by members of
the Black Muslim faith, see, e.g., United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 453 F.2d 147
(3d Cir. 1971) ; Wilson v. Prasse, 404 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1968) ; Wilson v. Prasse,
325 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd 463 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1972).
In O'Malley v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 785 (3d Cir. 1973), the visiting privileges
of two Catholic priests were withdrawn because the authorities felt they were con-
ducting a political rally under the guise of an Afro-American Mass, rather than a
religious service. The Third Circuit held: "[Wihere a state does afford prison
inmates the opportunity of practicing a religion, it may not, without reasonable justi-
fication, curtail the practice of religion by one sect." Id. at 795. The priests' claim
that their right to preach in the prison was guaranteed under the first amendment
was denied, but the court remanded for a determination of the nature of the mass.
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universal spiritual force. Prison officials considered the sect's meetings
a forum for the erosion of essential discipline under the guise of
religion. In Theriault v. Carlson,"6 3 however, the district court ordered
federal officials to permit the sect's members to meet in the Atlanta
Penitentiary and in all other federal institutions, concluding:
This court interprets the First Amendment as guaranteeing
the right of federal prisoners who share a common religion to
gather for devotional meetings and to study the teachings of that
religion. This right cannot be denied the members of the Church
of the New Song.
4 64
Under the aegis of the eighth and fourteenth amendments, the
courts have also begun to examine physical conditions within prisons. In
Rhem v. McGrath465 the Legal Aid Society of New York City brought
a suit in federal court on behalf of all prisoners of the Manhattan
House of Detention, known as the Tombs, to close the overcrowded
facility until such time as it could be made safe, sanitary, and decent
for its inmates. Although the court indicated that the prison conditions
were far from satisfactory, the judge declined to rule that: such con-
ditions constituted cruel and unusual punishment within the eighth
amendment. It did, however, order the city's Department of Correctional
Services to adopt and display comprehensive rules governing the con-
duct of inmates and guards at the Tombs. These rules were to be sub-
mitted to the court for approval and then made available to all the
inmates.
In Newman v. Alabama,46 6 the district court found such barbarous
and shocking neglect of the medical needs of Alabama prison inmates
as to give rise to an eighth amendment violation and ordered a drastic
reform of prison health care services:
It is the holding of this Court that failure of the Board of
Corrections to provide sufficient medical facilities and staff to
afford inmates basic elements of adequate medical care constitutes
a willful and intentional violation of the rights of prisoners guar-
anteed under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Further,
the intentional refusal by correctional officers to allow inmates
access to medical personnel and to provide prescribed medicines
and other treatment is cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Constitution.
467
463. 339 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
464. Id. at 385.
465. 326 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
466. 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
467. Id. at 285-86.
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After the Attica uprising, the Second Circuit in Inmates of Attica
Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller"" ordered the district court to
grant preliminary injunctive relief against further physical abuse, tor-
tures, beatings, or similar conduct. In the conclusion to the court's
opinion, Circuit Judge Mansfield stated:
The district court is directed to enter a preliminary injunction
against such conduct and to consider any more specific measures
that might be ordered to implement the injunction, including the
appointment of federal monitors to serve at Attica. The injunction
may be vacated upon a showing that it is no longer required for the
protection of the inmates. 6
The Eighth Circuit in Holt v. Sarver47 required Arkansas to
initiate a wholesale reform of its prison system. The court expressed
reluctance to interfere with the operation and discipline of a state
prison, but nevertheless held:
A hearing . . . should be held to determine whether appropriate
steps have been taken to cure the constitutional deficiencies found
by the court, after which such further order as may be appropriate
should be entered.
Supervision over the state prisons by a federal court should
of course not be kept in force for any longer period than necessary
to provide reasonable assurance that incarceration therein will not
constitute cruel and inhuman punishment violative of the Eighth
Amendment. 7 '
In Landman v. Royster472 District Judge Merhige came to the
conclusion that Virginia prisoners who were subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment by Virginia prison authorities in violation of
their constitutional rights were entitled to recover compensatory dam-
ages from their jailers, including the director of the Division of Correc-
tions, who had had personal knowledge and, in some instances, had
taken affirmative action to approve the unconstitutional deprivations.
468. 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.), application for temporary restraining order or injunc-
tion denied, 404 U.S. 809 (1971).
469. Id. at 25.
470. 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
471. Id. at 309.
472. 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973); accord, United States ex rel. Bracey
v. Grenoble, 356 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1973). In Landman v. Royster, 354 F.
Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1973), Judge Merhige imposed a contempt fine of $25,000
jointly and severally on Virginia prison officials for not carrying out the court's
previous order directing the defendants to implement minimum due process procedures,
but would have suspended the imposition of the fine if the defendants promptly took
the necessary steps to carry out the court's order. See generally R. GOLDFARB & L.
SINGER, AFTER CONVICTION (1973); Note, Decency and Fairness: An Emerging
ludicial Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. Rv. 841 (1971).
For other recent cases involving prison conditions, see Appendix VI infra.
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The latest development in the protection of the rights of prisoners
has been the appointment of an ombudsman for inmates. Minnesota
created an ombudsman for correction in 1972. He provides a channel
for complaints of mistreatment or loss of rights for the inmates of
the state's nine correctional facilities. 473 After the Attica rebellion in
September 1972 which left 43 prisoners and guards dead, the Cor-
rectional Association of New York - a 127-year-old prison reform
group - revived interest in the idea of an ombudsman to ventilate
the grievances of inmates. In March 1973 the Association announced
its intention of establishing such an ombudsman, but Governor Rocke-
feller strongly opposed the idea and introduced legislation to sharply
curtail the Association's official advisory role.474
Retrospectively viewing a period as short as the past five years,
one can appreciate the distance the courts have traveled in applying
due process concepts to prison proceedings, practices, and conditions.
P. Treatment of Juveniles
Custody is custody, whether of adult deviants, juvenile delin-
quents, or incompetents. As the Tenth Circuit stated in Heryford v.
Parker,7 ' a habeas corpus proceeding brought by a mother on behalf
of her son who had been committed to a state training school for
the feeble-minded and epileptic:
[Wie have a situation in which the liberty of an individual is
at stake, and we think the reasoning in Gault emphatically applies.
It matters not whether the proceedings be labeled "civil" or
"criminal" or whether the subject matter be mental instability
or juvenile delinquency. It is the likelihood of involuntary in-
carceration - whether for punishment as an adult for a crime,
rehabilitation as a juvenile for delinquency, or treatment and
training as a feeble-minded or mental incompetent - which com-
mands observance of the constitutional safeguards of due process.
Where, as in both proceedings for juveniles and mentally de-
ficient persons, the state undertakes to act in parens patriae, it
has the inescapable duty to vouchsafe due process, and this neces-
sarily includes the duty to see that a subject of an involuntary
commitment proceedings is afforded the opportunity to the guiding
hand of legal counsel at every step of the proceedings, unless
effectively waived by one authorized to act in his behalf.476
473. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1972, at 25, cols. 4-5.
474. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1973, at 47, col. 1. Recently, Robert Coulson,
president of the American Arbitration Association suggested an arbitration system
for resolving the grievances of prison inmates. Coulson, Justice Behind Bars: Time
to 'Arbitrate, 59 A.B.A.J. 612 (1973).
475. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
476. Id. at 396.
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In Kent v. United States4 77 and In re Gault4T  the Supreme Court
took a dim view of the value of placing wide discretionary powers
in the hands of officials who have jurisdiction over juveniles, and
held that juveniles must be accorded due process. The Kent Court
stated:
The Juvenile Court is theoretically engaged in determining the
needs of the child and of society rather than adjudicating criminal
conduct. The objectives are to provide measures of guidance and
rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to
fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment. The State is
parens patriae rather than prosecuting attorney and judge. But
the admonition to function in a "parental" relationship is not
an invitation to procedural arbitrariness.
There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for
concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he
gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children. 7
In Gault the Court added:
Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled dis-
cretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor
substitute for principle and procedure. In 1937, Dean Pound
wrote: "The powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in com-
parison with those of our juvenile courts ....",'
Considering the due process issue, the Kent Court held that a
determination by a juvenile court under a provision of the District
of Columbia Juvenile Court Act"5' to waive its jurisdiction and permit
the petitioner to be tried as an adult in the district court, entitled
the juvenile to a hearing, access by his counsel to the social records
and probation reports which the presiding court relied upon, and to a
statement of reasons for the court's decision.
In Gault the Court found the practices of Arizona's juvenile
courts wanting. The complaint alleged that the juvenile made a lewd
telephone call to a woman neighbor, but the complainant was never
required to attend or testify at any hearing. The Court held that
477. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
478. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
479. 383 U.S. 554-56.
480. 387 U.S. at 18.
In, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Court ruled that delinquency must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt when a juvenile is charged with an act which
would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. Id. at 359.
481. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 11-1553 (1961).
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where there is a dispositional hearing for a juvenile that may result in
his confinement in a juvenile institution, he and his parents are entitled
to be notified in writing of the hearing, to the assistance of counsel,
including appointed counsel, to the right to present evidence, and to
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses produced by
the state.
Although the Court has ruled that juveniles have due process
rights, accounts that come out of institutions where juveniles are
kept in custody continue to be horrifying. Lollis v. New York State
Department of Social Services,82 for example, dealt with the two-week
solitary confinement of a 14-year-old girl who was an inmate of a
New York "Training School" as a "person in need of supervision."
She had never been accused or convicted of a crime. Immediately
after she had become involved in a fight with another inmate and a
matron she was confined, without a hearing, in a small room which
was stripped of all facilities normally available to inmates. "She was
completely unoccupied for 24 hours daily."4 " The federal district
court held such treatment to be cruel and unusual punishment as
proscribed by the eighth amendment.
Roberts v. Williams4 4 involved a 14-year-old male prisoner who
had been confined at the Leflore County Farm, Mississippi, for stealing
$2.11 worth of groceries. He was performing work on county roads
when a shotgun, in the hands of a trusty guard, discharged into his
face causing brain damage, the loss of both eyes, and other injuries.
In a suit brought for the maimed boy by his father and guardian, the
courts held that there was liability under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. The Fifth Circuit stated:
The evidence herein as to beating of juvenile and adult prisoners
and the use of a trusty guard previously convicted of assault
with intent to kill, come into focus with the demonstrated in-
difference to prisoners' safety, as establishing a cruel state of mind
which with physical harm and causation provide the basis of
Eighth Amendment tort liability.4"5
An illustrative case pointing out the shortcomings of juvenile




in which Chief Judge Pettine inquired into the Rhode Island practices
482. 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ; Lollis v. New York State Dep't of Social
Servs., 328 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
483. 322 F. Supp. at 475.
484. 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971).
485. Id. at 828.
486. 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
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concerning the detention and confinement of juveniles and found them
sadly deficient in due process.
There is no psychiatrist or clinical psychologist on the BTS
staff .... There is evidence, and I so find, of at least two probable
suicide attempts by boys who received no medical or psychiatric
care proximately following the attempts. The response of BTS
supervisors to these suicide attempts was solitary confinement.
Two of these cells are stripped isolation cells, containing
nothing but a toilet, and a mattress on the floor. The cells have,
at times, not had artificial lighting. In one of the cells, the
window is boarded over, rendering it completely dark at times.
These cells are known as "bug-out" rooms and are used for
solitary confinement of boys.4"7
The plaintiff had sought an injunction prohibiting the confinement of
juveniles in any facility which did not meet minimum standards of
cleanliness and which failed to provide adequate care or make adequate
provision for the personal hygiene of the inmates.""8 Judge Pettine
ordered the defendants to provide these minimum conditions of con-
finement, stating:
The state has offered no reason to justify this discrimination
against juveniles .... They have been confined through a process
offering them fewer protections than adults have; they may not
now be treated worse than the adult inmates are.
480
Response to the problems of juvenile detention has not been limited
to the grant of relief in specific suits. For example, United States
487. Id. at 1359.
488. The injunction requested sought the following conditions:
a) A room equipped with lighting sufficient for an inmate to read by
until 10:00 p.m.;
b) sufficient clothing to meet seasonal needs;
c) bedding, including blankets, sheets, pillows, pillow cases and mat-
tresses; such bedding must be changed once a week;
d) personal hygiene supplies, including soap, toothpaste, towels, toilet
paper, and a toothbrush;
e) a change of undergarments and socks every day;
f) minimum writing materials: pen, pencil, paper and envelopes;
g) prescription eyeglasses, if needed;
h) equal access to all books, periodicals and other reading materials
located in the Training School;
i) daily showers;
j) daily access to medical facilities, including the provision of a 24-hour
nursing service;
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District Judge Lasker ordered the appointment of an "independent
ombudsman" to handle the grievances of children held in juvenile
detention facilities in New York City, and directed city officials to
submit a plan describing "the qualifications and duties of the ombuds-
man and procedures for his appointment."49 The New York Court of
Appeals struck down the practice of putting children who were accused
of no crime but who were called "persons in need of supervision"
(PINS) together with children who had been convicted of some
offenses and thus been classified as "juvenile delinquents." '' Finally,
in February 1973, Robert W. Meserve, president of the American Bar
Association, and Roger M. Blough, president of the Institute of Judicial
Administration, announced the formation of a national commission to
develop this country's first comprehensive standards and practical
guidelines for juvenile justice. The two leaders appointed more than
490. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); 359 F. Supp. 478
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). See Sibley, Juvenile Jail Ombudsman Decreed, N.Y. Times, June
15, 1973, at 23, col. 6.
In 1972, the New York State Division for Youth put into operation an
experimental ombudsman program for the troubled teenagers who live in the institu-
tions that it runs. See Sibley, Assisting Youthful Inmates Puts Strain on Ombudsmen,
N.Y. Times, July 31, 1973, at 39, col. 6.
491. See Oelsner, Reform Schools Limited by Court to Delinquents, N.Y. Times,
July 6, 1973, at 1, col. 5; Oelsner,. City's Child Care is Termed Lagging, N.Y. Times,
July 29, 1973, at 46, col. 4.
For other recent cases involving the due process rights of juveniles in
custody, see, e.g., Lucarell v. McNair, 453 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1972) (juvenile had a
civil rights cause of action against a referee and administrative officer of a juvenile
court for personal assault and illegal incarceration) ; Shone v. Maine, 406 F.2d 844
(1st Cir.), judgment vacated with instructions to dismiss as moot, 346 U.S. 6 (1969)
(transfer of a juvenile from boys' training center to men's correctional center based
on an administrative finding of incorrigibility without a hearing violated due process
and equal protection); Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973) ("The
widespread practice of beating, slapping, kicking, and otherwise physically abusing
juvenile inmates, in the absence of any exigent circumstances, . . . violates state
law, ... the avowed policies of the Texas Youth Council .... and the eighth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution." Id. at 173.) Black Bonnet v. South Dakota,
357 F. Supp. 889 (D.S.D. 1973) (South Dakota statute that permits the incarceration
of juveniles without a hearing held unconstitutional) ; Patterson v. Hopkins, 350 F.
Supp. 676 (N.D. Miss. 1972) ("While the ideal situation would be to establish and
maintain a fully equipped and properly supervised juvenile detention facility within the
county for the detention of juveniles awaiting an adjudicatory hearing, and thus elimi-
nate the necessity of detaining a juvenile in the county jail, the court does not feel that
the failure to provide such a facility deprives the juveniles of the county of the 'due
process and fair treatment' mentioned in Kent and its progeny." Id. at 684); Miller
v. Quatsoe, 348 F. Supp. 764 (E.D. Wis. 1972) ("when the filing of the complaint
determines juvenile court jurisdiction, then this filing cannot be delayed in order to
avoid juvenile court jurisdiction unless the juvenile is granted a hearing with the
necessary constitutional safeguard." Id. at 766) ; Baker v. Hamilton, 345 F. Supp.
345 (W.D. Ky. 1972) (confinement of juveniles in county jail constituted cruel and
unusual punishment); United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1971)
(court directed federal and District of Columbia officials to submit plan for alleviating
congestion at the existing youth facility provided for by the Youth Corrections Act in
order to bring the facility into compliance with the act) ; In re E.M.B --...... A 2d ---
(D.C. Super. Ct. 1973) (D.C. statute permitting civil committment of "habitually dis-
obedient and ungovernable" juveniles as "persons in need of supervision" was uncon-
stitutionally vague).
[VOL. 19 : p. 197
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20 judges, professors, public officials, and experts in education, psy-
chology, law, and corrections to the commission.9 2
Judge Irving R. Kaufman, the commission's chairman, stated:
We hope to achieve substantive reform of the juvenile justice
system, which is plagued by failures and inefficiencies. There are
plenty of studies and reports, but there are no cohesive guidelines
on handling the children in trouble for police, judges, legislators,
social workers, schools, correctional institutions and other agencies.
More important, there is no judicial standards program en-
dorsed by those ultimately responsible for law and judicial reform
in this country. The Institute of Judicial Administration and the
American Bar Association will attempt to fill that void.493
However, human beings make drastic changes with painful slow-
ness. In the meantime, the courts will have to continue to apply due
process concepts to the detention and confinement of juveniles.
Q. Treatment of Incompetents
The stories that are told about the confinement of incompetents
are as horrifying as those that come out of institutions for the detention
of juvenile delinquents. In Pennsylvania, for example, a 16-year-old
male, who had allegedly broken a store window near his home in
Philadelphia, spent 22 years in prison without either a criminal trial
or a civil commitment proceeding. As the result of a suit by the
American Civil Liberties Union, he and 129 more individuals similarly
situated were released in 1966; all had been incarcerated for periods
ranging up to 25 years.4 94 In Michigan, a 36-year-old mental patient
confined in a state mental hospital for 18 years agreed to experimental
surgery on his brain to change his behavior. The experiment was
halted by suit filed by a group of citizens on his behalf which challenged
the propriety of allowing anyone held involuntarily to submit to such
an operation. A three-judge panel of the Wayne County Circuit Court
held that the mental patient was being dealt with unconstitutionally,
and stated:
The State's interest in performing psychosurgery and the
legal ability of the involuntarily detained mental patient to give
consent must bow to the First Amendment, which protects the
492. Lubasch, Juvenile Justice Facing an Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1973,
at 27, col. 1. See also 18 A.B.A. NEws, Apr. 1973, at 1, 6.
493. As quoted in Lubasch, Juvenile Justice Facing an Inquiry, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 18, 1973, at 27, col. 1.
494. See King, Man Jailed 22 Years in Smashing of a Window Sues Pennsylvania,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1973, at 12, col. 1.
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generation and free flow of ideas from unwarranted interference
with one's mental processes.495
The National Association for Mental Health and the American Asso-
ciation on Mental Deficiency, together with three mental patients,
brought a civil suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia against the Department of Labor to end what the plaintiffs
called widespread "peonage" in mental institutions. The suit charged
that thousands of residents in non-federal hospitals and other institu-
tions were working daily at menial jobs and receiving either token pay
as low as one cent an hour, or no pay at all. Irving H. Chase. im-
mediate past president of the National Association for Mental Health,
said at a news conference that there were certainly more than 100,000
such institutionalized workers, and possibly as many as 200,000.40
6
Finally, in New York State Association for Retarded Children v.
Rockefeller,40 7 the district court, faced with inhumane and shocking
conditions at the Willowbrook State School for the Mentally Retarded,
directed the state to remedy the situation. The court ordered the
immediate hiring of additional ward attendants sufficient to assure a
one-to-nine ratio of staff to residents to insure the residents of pro-
tection from physical harm, and the hiring of at least 85 more nurses,
30 more physical therapists, 15 additional physicians, and sufficient
recreational staff.
In a series of four cases - Baxstrom v. Herold,95 Jackson v.
Indiana,00 McNeil v. Director,00 and Miller v. Gomez5°' - the
495. Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, 42 U.S.L.W. 2063, 2064
(Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne County, July 10, 1973). See Salpukas, Debate on Psycho-
surgery Goes on in Detroit Court, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1973, at 64, col. 1.
496. See Schmeck, Suit Asks Department of Labor to Halt Alleged Peonage in
Mental Institutions, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1973, at 21, col. 1.
497. 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). See Kaplan, Cleanup Ordered at Willow-
brook, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1973, at 1, col. 7.
In the area of treatment an interesting situation has developed in Alabama
and Georgia. In Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), the district
court held that any person committed against his will to a state mental institution
had a constitutional right to "adequate treatment from a medical standpoint." Id.
at 785. Subsequently, the court heard extensive testimony from professionals on the
standards needed to secure adequacy of treatment and wrote a detailed set of guide-
lines that the state had to meet in order to provide this treatment, including specific
staff-patient ratios. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), 344 F.
Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972). See Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J.
499 (1961). However, in a virtually identical case in Georgia, Burnham v. Depart-
ment of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), the district court held that
there was no constitutional right to medical treatment and dismissed the case. The court
found that "there has been no showing of a denial of a constitutionally protected right
nor a federally guaranteed statutory right." Id. at 1341. On appeal, these cases were
consolidated for argument and argued before the Fifth Circuit in December 1972. For
an account of the argument, see N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1972, at 11, col. 10.
498. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
499. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
500. 407 U.S. 245 (1972).
501. 412 U.S. 914 (1973).
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Supreme Court has set forth the constitutional rights available to
incompetents in custody. Baxstrom, a prisoner, was declared insane
by a prison physician. His sentence expired and official custody of
him shifted to the Department of Mental Hygiene, but he continued to
be confined at Dannemora State Hospital, an institution under the
jurisdiction of the New York Department of Correctional Services.
The Court held that he was entitled to hearings to redetermine the issue
of his insanity and whether he must be kept in a maximum security
hospital, stating:
We hold that petitioner was denied equal protection of the
laws by the statutory procedure under which a person may be
civilly committed at the expiration of his penal sentence without
the jury review available to all other persons civilly committed
in New York. Petitioner was further denied equal protection of
the laws by his civil commitment to an institution maintained by
the Department of Correction beyond the expiration of his prison
term without a judicial determination that he is dangerously
mentally ill such as that afforded to all so committed except those,
like Baxstrom, nearing the expiration of a penal sentence. 5 2
Jackson was charged with purse snatching, but was committed
for an indefinite period after it was determined at a pretrial competency
hearing that he would be unable to understand the charges against
him or participate in his defense. The Court held that the Indiana
commitment procedures allowing indefinite commitment violated both
the equal protection and the due process clauses since absent the criminal
charge Jackson would be subject to a more stringent commitment
standard and to a more lenient standard of release. The effect of the
procedure in this case was to condemn him to a strong probability of
permanent institutionalization. Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority, noted:
At the least, due process requires that the nature and duration
of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for
which the individual is committed.
We hold, consequently, that a person charged by a State
with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his
incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reason-
able period of time necessary to determine whether there is a
substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the
foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then
the State must either institute the customary civil commitment
502. 383 U.S. at 462.
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proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other
citizen, or release the defendant.5 °3
In McNeil, the lower court had sentenced the prisoner to five
years for assault, but rather than committing him to prison, it referred
him to Patuxent Institution for examination to determine whether he
should be committed to that institution for an indefinite term under
Maryland's law relating to defective delinquency.50 4 He served his full
sentence, but remained in confinement because no determination had
been made as to whether he should be committed to the Patuxent
Institution. The Court ordered him released on the ground that his
confinement after the expiration of his sentence was violative of due
process, stating that "[a] confinement that is in fact indeterminate
cannot rest on procedures designed to authorize a brief period of
observation.5 05
In the fourth case, Miller v. Gomez,5 °  the Court summarily af-
firmed a decision of a three-judge district court invalidating certain
New York statutory provisions because they permitted a criminal de-
fendant, too mentally ill to stand trial, to be committed to a New York
mental hospital operated by the State Correction Department without
a jury determination that he was dangerous - a determination that
was accorded to other mentally ill persons. 507
Three-judge district courts have acted to invalidate other state
civil procedures for the commitment of incompetents on constitutional
grounds. For example, a three-judge panel, in Dixon v. Attorney
General, °0 held that the applicable section of the Pennsylvania Mental
Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966,509 authorizing the commit-
ment of any person who appears, upon an application accompanied by
certificates of two physicians, to be mentally disabled and in need of
care, was unconstitutional on its face. The court found the challenged
provision "to be almost completely devoid of the due process of law
required by the Fourteenth Amendment."51 In Wisconsin, a three-
judge court in Lessard v. Schmidt,5 ' found that state's civil commit-
503. 406 U.S. at 738.
504. MD. ANN. CODE art 31B (1957) (Supp. 1973).
505. 407 U.S. at 249.
506. 412 U.S. 914 (1973).
507. The New York State Department of Mental Hygiene estimated that the
Court's ruling would affect between 275 and 300 patients at Matteawan State Hospital,
Beacon, New York, including George Metesky, the "Mad Bomber," who was one of
the plaintiffs. See Tolchin, High Court Backs Commitment Curb, N.Y. Times, May
30, 1973, at 14, col. 1.
508. 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
509. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4004 (1969).
510. 325 F. Supp. at 972.
511. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded for lack of
specificity, 94 S. Ct. 713 (1974).
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ment procedure512 for mentally ill persons on a preponderance of the
evidence to be invalid on many grounds:
We conclude that the Wisconsin civil commitment procedure
is constitutionally defective insofar as it fails to require effective
and timely notice of the "charges" under which a person is sought
to be detained; fails to require adequate notice of all rights, in-
cluding the right to jury trial; permits detention longer than 48
hours without a hearing on probable cause; permits detention
longer than two weeks without a full hearing on the necessity
for commitment; permits commitment based upon a hearing in
which the person charged with mental illness is not represented by
adversary counsel, at which hearsay evidence is admitted, and
in which psychiatric evidence is presented without the patient
having been given the benefit of the privilege against self-incrim-
ination; permits commitment without proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that the patient is both "mentally ill" and dangerous; and
fails to require those seeking commitment to consider less restric-
tive alternatives to commitment. 513
R. Public Housing
Over 15 years ago Circuit Judge Edgerton, in Rudder v. United
States,51 4 pointed out that the government acting as landlord was
still the government and had to act in accordance with due process.
The Rudder case arose under the harsh Gwinn Amendment, passed
512. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 51.02(5) (1957).
513. 349 F. Supp. at 1103.
For other recent cases involving the rights of institutionalized incompetents,
see, e.g., In re Bailey, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (involuntary commitment
of person found mentally ill by a preponderance of the evidence rather than
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt violates due process); Wheeler v. Glass,
473 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973) (class action by two institutionalized, mentally re-
tarded youths that alleged they were bound to their beds in spread-eagle fashion
for 77V hours in a public area of the hospital and were made to wash walls
for long periods while barely clothed stated a cause of action under the Civil Rights
Act) ; Jones v. Robinson, 440 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (in order to transfer a
patient to the maximum security section of a hospital "some minimal degree of due
process is required in order to make as certain as the hospital authorities reasonably
can the correctness of their decisions." Id. at 251) ; Burchett v. Bower, 356 F. Supp.
1278 (D. Ariz. 1973) (by a state statute and "by committing Burchett . . . to the
Hospital . . . the State of Arizona has both determined that he is in need of mental
treatment and has undertaken the corresponding responsibility to provide it." Id. at
1281) ; United States v. Pardue, 354 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Conn. 1973) (federal de-
fendant accused of bank robbery was not incompetent to stand trial, and since it was
not foreseeable that he would be held incompetent, he was ordered released and indict-
ment dismissed after three years because "there are no federal facilities which offer
appropriate psychiatric services and adequate security for the treatment of the
defendant with a mental disorder, not temporary in nature." Id. at 1377-78) ; Davy
v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (Alabama's sexual psychopath
statute held unconstitutional); McCray v. State, 40 U.S.L.W. 2307 (Md. Cir. Ct.
Montgomery County, Nov. 11, 1971) (due process clause bars assignment of inmates
at Maryland institution for defective delinquents to disciplinary solitary confinement
without notice of charges, impartial hearing, and opportunity to offer defense) ; Fhagen
v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 278 N.E.2d 615, 328 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1972) (notice and a
hearing may follow confinement of a mental patient in an urgent case).
514. 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955), rev'g 105 A.2d 741 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1954).
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in 1952 and amended the following year, which forbade any housing
unit constructed under the United States Housing Act of 1937 to be
occupied by anyone "who is a member of an organization designated
as subversive by the Attorney General.'""'5 Despite this provision, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held that the refusal on the part of tenants to sign a so-called certifi-
cation of non-membership in subversive organizations was an invalid
basis for eviction. Chief Judge Edgerton stated:
The government as landlord is still the government. It must not
act arbitrarily, for, unlike private landlords, it is subject to the
requirements of due process of law. Arbitrary action is not due
process. 5 6
More recently, the Second Circuit in Escalera v. New York City
Housing Authority.. 7 held that a class action complaint on behalf of
tenants in New York City public housing projects against the New
York City Housing Authority stated a cause of action because the
procedures followed in terminating their tenancies violated due process.
The court found the following difficiencies: (1) one-sentence summary
notices of termination did not adequately inform the tenants of the
evidence against them; (2) the tenants were denied access to relevant
Housing Authority records; and (3) the tenants lacked the opportunity
to confront and cross-examine the persons who supplied the information
in the records.51
The Department of Urban Development (HUD) has issued regu-
lations that establish model lease and grievance procedures to protect
the rights of public housing tenants.51 9 In Housing Authority v. United
'States Housing Authority5  ten local housing authorities, later joined
by 14 others, brought suit against HUD alleging that the regulations
were issued in violation of the notice requirement of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)5 2' and that they exceeded the limits of HUD's
515. Act of July 5, 1952, ch. 578, 66 Stat. 403.
516. 226 F.2d at 53.
517. 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970).
518. 425 F.2d at 862.
519. HUD Renewal and Housing Management Circular RHM 7465.8 (Feb. 22,
1971); HUD Renewal and Housing Management Circular RHM 7465.9 (Feb. 22,
1971). Renewal and Housing Management circulars are the customary vehicle for
HUD rulings and are kept in the various HUD offices throughout the country.
Lefcoe, HUD's Authority to Mandate Tenants' Rights in Public Housing, 80 YALE
L.J. 463, n.2 (1971).
The purpose of RHM 7465.8 is to set forth standards and criteria of man-
agement-tenant relationships that are to be included in low rent public housing
program leases, while the purpose of RHM 7465.9 is to set forth requirements and
recommendations for grievance procedures required by R2HM 7465.8.
520. 468 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927 (1973).
521. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1970).
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rule-making power. The district court granted summary judgment
for the plaintiffs and enjoined the enforcement of the regulations. The
Eighth Circuit, finding that the regulations bore a reasonable relation-
ship to the purposes for which HUD's rule-making power was author-
ized, reversed, holding that the regulations were not invalidated by
the policy expressed in section 1 of the United States Housing Act 522
entrusting local housing agencies with a maximum amount of responsi-
bility in the administration of low rent housing programs - and that the
regulations fell within the exemption from the APA notice require-
ments for matters "relating to agency management or personnel or to
public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.
' 52 3
Brown v. Housing Authority 24 also concerned the validity of
HUD regulations. Brown was a class action brought against the
Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief against termination of tenancies. The
plaintiffs claimed that the housing authority summary procedures
violated HUD regulations and due process guarantees. The district
court granted the plaintiffs judgment on the pleadings.5"' The Seventh
Circuit affirmed holding that the authority's procedures were invalid
under HUD regulations and for that reason did not reach the due
process issue. The housing authority argued that the regulations
exceeded HUD's authority and were issued in violation of the APA
notice requirements. The Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion
as did the Eighth in Housing Authority, deciding that the regulation
was valid and fit within the "public benefits" exception to the APA
notice requirements.
The Fourth Circuit held in Caulder v. Durham Housing Au-
thority 26 that the due process clause required that tenants in a federally
subsidized North Carolina housing project be afforded notice, hearing,
and administrative adjudication before the termination of their leases.
522. 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970).
523. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1970).
On appeal, the plaintiffs also argued that coerced implementation of the
HUD regulations by withholding funds violated the due process clause. 468 F.2d
at 10. The court recognized that in Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268
(1969), "the Supreme Court strongly suggested that such an action might violate the
constitutional prohibition of impairment of contracts," 468 F.2d at 10, but noted that
since there had been no withholding of funds and that since none had been threatened,
the issue of contractual impairment was purely hypothetical, premature for decision. Id.
524. 471 F.2d 63 (7th Cir. 1972).
525. 340 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Wis. 1972). Attempting to meet the plaintiffs' claim
that the housing authority procedures violated due process, the defendants contended,
in the district court, that the availability of a hearing in a state court eviction action
satisfied due process requirements. The district court, responded: "The fact that
tenants in Wisconsin public housing are afforded a hearing in the eviction action in
the state court does not, in my judgment, negate the need of procedural due process
at the time that notice of termination is given." Id. at 115.
526. 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971).
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The circuit court, analogizing the process due tenants upon removal
from federally subsidized housing to the due process requirements for
the termination of public assistance benefits, stated:
Succinctly stated, Goldberg requires (1) timely and adequate
notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, (2) an
opportunity on the part of the tenant to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses, (3) the right of a tenant to be represented by
counsel, provided by him to delineate the issues, present the factual
contentions in an orderly manner, conduct cross-examination and
generally to safeguard his interests, (4) a decision, based on
evidence adduced at the hearing, in which the reasons for decision
and the evidence relied on are set forth, and (5) an impartial
decision maker.
52 7
McClellan v. University Heights, Inc.52 involved an apartment
complex financed by mortgage loans guaranteed through a provision
of the National Housing Act. 5' The plaintiff tenants were notified
that their leases would not be renewed. They requested statements of
reasons and hearings on the decision not to renew, but their requests
were refused. They filed a class action suit, and the district court
granted them injunctive relief. The court balanced the value of a
stable homelife in decent housing at an affordable rent against the
insignificant harm the owners of the apartment complex would suffer
as long as they continued to receive rent from their tenants. Since
that balance of hardships weighed in favor of the tenants, the court
held they were entitled to a full, fair, and impartial hearing prior to
their evictions.
53 0
Recently, in Otero v. New York City Housing Authority,531 it
has been held that failure of the local housing authority to follow a
published regulation which gave first priority to former site residents
in housing constructed on the site from which they had been displaced,
and its action in giving preference to Jews because the project was
527. 433 F.2d at 1004, citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
528. 338 F. Supp. 374 (D.R.I. 1972); accord, McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp.
1122 (D. Mass. 1970).
529. 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d) (3) (1970).
530. 338 F. Supp. at 382.
In Burr v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 347 F. Supp. 1202
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified and aft'd, 479 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1973), the court held
that the public housing authority's failure to provide tenants with a hearing before the
imposition of a monthly service charge violated due process.
A federal district court in Davis v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority,
311 F. Supp. 795 (N.D. Ohio 1970), held that it violated due process for applicants
to be ruled ineligible for housing without an evidentiary hearing.
The Fourth Circuit in Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973), carried
these trends a step further by holding that under federal legislation, FHA regulations,
and custom, there was a property right to the continued occupancy of an apartment
until there exists a cause to evict other than the mere expiration of the lease.
531. 354 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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conveniently located adjacent to an old and historic synagogue, violated
the supremacy, due process, equal protection, and establishment clauses
of the Federal Constitution. The housing authority was permanently
enjoined from leasing units in violation of its own regulation and
from leasing units on a priority basis to persons seeking proximity to
their place of worship."' When granting the preliminary injunction
the court had stated:
The short of this subject is that the Housing Authority, in
dishonoring its own regulations and denying first priority to
plaintiffs and others in their class, has denied them the due
process of law. If the Housing Authority's course be deemed
less than a constitutional violation, it is in any event a breach of
legal duty correctible in this proceeding. Together with the other
circumstances of the case, the error of the City's officials has re-
sulted, foreseeably and directly, in a racially discriminatory pattern
of admissions to the apartments in question. Plaintiffs and their
class are thus denied the equal protection of the laws.58
S. Public Welfare Assistance
One of the cases which laid to rest the distinction between right
and privilege was Goldberg v. Kelly. 84 The Court there held that the
532. Id. at 957.
533. 344 F. Supp. 737, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted).
In Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 354 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
the court permanently enjoined the Housing Authority:
[F]rom renting any apartments in its Seward Park Extension buildings to any
individual or family unless and until all former site occupants, who are eligible,
(without regard to housing need) and have applied for and for whom there is
an apartment of appropriate size, are offered leases in the building.
Id. at 957. But the Second Circuit reversed for new hearings, 484 F.2d 1122, 1140
(2d Cir. 1973). Subsequently, the contending parties arrived at a settlement of their
differences. See Darnton, Ethnic Battle on Selecting Tenants Apparently Over, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 11, 1974, at 37, col. 1.
For other recent cases involving the due process and other rights of tenants
in federally assisted housing, see, e.g., Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296
(2d Cir. 1971) (tenants in low income federally assisted housing not entitled to trial-
type hearing before the FHA with reference to proposed rent increases that the agency
authorized upon the termination of existing tenancies) ; People's Rights Organization
v. Bethlehem Associates, 356 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (no right to trial hearing
on rent increases in federally assisted housing); Lopez v. White Plains Housing
Authority, 355 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (limiting eligibility for public housing
to families with an adult citizen member "conflicts with the guarantees of the four-
teenth amendment and thus denies plaintiffs equal protection of the laws." Id. at
1026); Neddo v. Housing Authority of City of Milwaukee, 335 F. Supp. 1397 (E.D.
Wis. 1971) (rejecting application for housing without a hearing because Authority
believed applicant owed rent from previous occupancy of public housing was arbitrary
and unreasonable); Sumpter v. White Plains Housing Authority, 29 N.Y.2d 420,
278 N.E.2d 892, 328 N.Y.S.2d 649, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 928 (1972) (rejected
applicant for public housing, as distinguished from evicted public housing tenant, is
not entitled to full evidentiary hearing).
534. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) ; accord Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970);
Brooks v. Center Twp., 485 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1973).
In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Court invalidated state
and federal statutory provisions which denied welfare assistance to residents of less
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fourteenth amendment's due process clause required that a recipient
of public assistance be given an evidentiary hearing before termination
of benefits. Justice Brennan wrote for the Court:
Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to"promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty
to ourselves and our Posterity." The same governmental interests
that counsel the provision of welfare, counsel as well its un-
interrupted provision to those eligible to receive it; pre-termination
evidentiary hearings are indispensable to that end. 5'
The hearing required, the Court stated, need not take the form of a
judicial or quasi-judicial trial, but must provide the recipient with
timely and adequate notice, the right of confrontation and cross-
examination, and the chance orally to present his own arguments and
evidence. The recipient must also be allowed the assistance of retained
counsel and must be given an impartial decision maker.
Mr. Justice Black, in a strong dissenting opinion, wrote:
This decision is thus only another variant of the view often
expressed by some members of this Court that the Due Process
Clause forbids any conduct that a majority of the Court believes"unfair," "indecent," or "shocking to their consciences.
I regret very much to be compelled to say that the Court today
makes a drastic and dangerous departure from a Constitution
written to control and limit the government and the judges and
moves toward a constitution designed to be no more and no less
than what the judges of a particular social and economic philosophy
declare on the one hand to be fair or on the other hand to be
shocking and unconscionable.""
Government officials - federal and state - were less than enthu-
siastic over the Court's ruling in Goldberg. They tried to limit the
than one year. The Court reiterated its position in Goldberg that the constitutional
challenge could not be met by arguing that public assistance benefits are a "privilege"
not a "right." Id. at 627 n.6.
535. 397 U.S. at 265.
In Alexander v. Silverman, 356 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D. Wis. 1973), the court
held that welfare applicants whose applications for general welfare relief were denied
were entitled as a matter of due process to a written statement of reasons and a post-
denial hearing. If, however, from the face of the application it was clear that the
applicant did not meet the Welfare Department's regulations, the procedures were not
required. Id. at 1181.
In addition, the Third Circuit, in Rochester v. Baganz, 479 F.2d 603 (3d
Cir. 1973), held that an across-the-board percentage reduction in the level of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits, effective eight days after
.notice was received by AFDC recipients, violated a regulation of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare that requires at least 15 days notice of "any proposed
action to terminate, suspend, or reduce assistance." 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (5) (1972).
Contra, Rochester v. Ingram, 337 F. Supp. 350 (D. Del. 1972).
536. 397 U.S. at 276, 277 (Black, J., dissenting). The Chief Justice and Justice
Stewart also dissented.
[VOL. 19: p. 197
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/1
ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
effect of the decision by confining its application to cases where
questions of fact, as distinct from policy questions, were involved.
In Yee-Litt v. Richardson,587 a class action suit brought by welfare
recipients who sought to have federal and state regulations which
permitted the summary termination of welfare benefits prior to a
hearing declared unconstitutional and enjoined, the court refused to
accept the distinction, finding it too unclear and unmanageable to be
implemented. The court characterized the fact-policy distinction as
"not viable in the welfare context for making the critical determination
of whether aid will be paid pending a hearing." '588 The Supreme Court
affirmed."3 9
The courts also have corrected welfare officials, burdened though
these officials may feel themselves to be, on various other points. In
Aguayo v. Richardson"" the plaintiffs challenged, on constitutional
and statutory grounds, New York's experimental work projects which
required that employable members of families receiving Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits in selected districts
throughout the state register for training and employment. A failure to
accept either a justifiable referral or to participate properly after such re-
ferral without good cause, constituted grounds for termination of
assistance. Recipients were entitled to a pre-termination hearing, but
an adverse determination at the hearing mandated a 30-day suspension
of benefits regardless of whether the recipient agreed to comply in the
future. The Second Circuit ordered the state defendants enjoined from
enforcing 30-day suspensions until a final determination of their validity.
Milwaukee County had a Work Experience and Training Projects
Division (WETPD) whose administrators determined whether persons
eligible for general welfare relief were fit for a Work Experience
assignment. Those selected were referred to openings in either a
verified position in private industry or an unclassified position with
537. 353 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd sub norm. Carleson v. Yee-Litt, 412
U.S. 924 (1973); cf. Mothers' and Children's Rights Organization v. Sterrett, 467
F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1972) (formal evidentiary hearing required where questions of
fact or law or policy questions entwined with questions of fact are involved).
538. 353 F. Supp. at 1000.
In concluding its opinion, the Yee-Litt court further explained its rejection
of the fact-policy distinction:
When the Supreme Court fashioned the minimum due process standards for
terminating welfare recipients, it was doing so in the context of a factual appeal.
The defendants have interpreted Goldberg to allow 'separate treatment for re-
cipients whose appeals do not raise issues of fact or judgment. However, imple-
mentation of this policy of distinguishing factual from policy appeals has resulted
in the improper denial of aid pending for significant numbers of welfare recipients.Id.
539. Carleson v. Yee-Litt, 412 U.S. 924 (1973).
540. 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 900 (1974).
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the county. Once the income from their employment made them
ineligible for relief, their case records at the Welfare Department were
formally closed. If these people lost their jobs, they had to reapply
as new applicants in order to receive general welfare relief. In Salandich
v. Milwaukee County,541 the court sustained a challenge to this proce-
dure, holding that those whose employment under WETPD had been
terminated were entitled to the welfare benefits for which they had
previously qualified until such time as the administrator of the program
determined that they were presently ineligible for such relief.542
In Arizona, Goldberg-mandated hearings were held to determine
whether indigents were physically able to work and thus no longer
entitled to welfare payments. The Arizona statute and regulation re-
quired indigents to tender witness fees and allowances as a condition
precedent to the issuance of subpoenaes for witnesses and to obtain the
cross-examination of authors of reports which indicated that the in-
digents were physically able to work. In Bacon v. Graham543 a three-
judge court invalidated the statutory provision and regulation as
violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.
T. Social Security Benefits
Although recipients of Social Security benefits have fared as
well as recipients of public welfare assistance in terms of being accorded
due process rights, claimants for Social Security disability benefits
have not fared as well as either. In Wright v. Finch54 4 a three-judge
federal district court in the District of Columbia held it a violation
of due process for the Social Security Administration to suspend or
terminate disability insurance benefits without first giving the recipient
an opportunity: (1) to respond; (2) to submit evidence supporting
his claim; and (3) to have conflicting evidence resolved by an im-
partial decision-maker. It should be noted, however, that the court
declined to delineate the details of a suitable procedure until the
Social Security Administration had an opportunity to develop pre-
suspension proceedings which would afford a recipient fundamental
due process.545 Shortly before the argument of this case in the
Supreme Court, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education
541. 351 F. Supp. 767 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
542. Id. at 771.
543. 348 F. Supp. 996 (D. Ariz. 1972).
For other recent cases involving welfare recipients or issues, see Appendix
VII infra.
544. 321 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1971), judgment vacated and case remanded sub
nom. Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208 (1972).
545. 321 F. Supp. at 387.
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and Welfare responded to the district court's ruling by adopting new
regulations providing for "notice of a proposed suspension and the
reasons therefor, plus an opportunity to submit rebuttal evidence."5"6
The new regulations did not, however, provide for an oral presentation.
Nevertheless, the Court vacated the judgment of the three-judge court
and remanded the case, commenting, with reference to reprocessing
under the new procedures: "If that process results in a determination
of entitlement to disability benefits, there will be no need to consider
the constitutional claim that claimants are entitled to an opportunity
to make an oral presentation.
' 47
Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion in which Justices Douglas
and Marshall joined, stated:
Avoidance of unnecessary constitutional decisions is certainly
a preferred practice when appropriate. But that course is in-
appropiate, indeed irresponsible, in this instance. We will not
avoid the necessity of deciding the important constitutional ques-
tion presented by claimants even should they prevail upon the
Secretary's reconsideration. The question is being pressed all
over the country....
The Secretary's new regulations permit discontinuance of
disability benefits without affording beneficiaries procedural due
process either in the form mandated by Goldberg v. Kelly or in
the form mandated by the District Court. The regulations require
only that the beneficiary be informed of the proposed suspension
or termination and the information upon which it is based and be
given an opportunity to submit a written response before benefits
are cut off. This procedure does not afford the beneficiary, as
Goldberg requires for welfare and old-age recipients, an evi-
dentiary hearing at which he may personally appear to offer oral
evidence and confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. 4
Richardson v. Perales549 involved the denial of a claim filed for
disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. The
claimant requested and was granted a hearing, was given written
notice, was afforded an opportunity to examine all documentary evi-
dence on file prior to the hearing, and was permitted to offer his own
evidence. The hearing examiner denied the claim, relying upon written
medical reports and the testimony of an independent "medical advisor"
546. 405 U.S. at 209.
547. Id.
548. Id. at 212-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
In Eldridge v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 520, 528 (W.D. Va. 1973), the court held
that a recipient of disability benefits "must be afforded a hearing in the nature of that
required for welfare beneficiaries ... prior to the termination of his benefits." Accord,
Williams v. Weinberger, 360 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
549. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
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who had not examined the claimant but had reviewed the medical
evidence. Following an adverse decision by the Appeals Council, the
claimant appealed to federal district court. The district court was re-
luctant to accept the written reports, unsworn and immune to cross-
examination, as substantial evidence supporting the agency determina-
tion and ordered the case remanded to the agency for a new hearing
before a different examiner. 5 The Fifth Circuit, while noting that
hearsay evidence was admissible under the Social Security Act,
affirmed, holding that such hearsay could not constitute substantial
evidence in light of the whole record since it was objected to and
contradicted by witnesses. 5 ' The Supreme Court reversed, concluding:
[A] written report by a licensed physician who has examined
the claimant and who sets forth in his report his medical findings
in his area of competence may be received as evidence in a dis-
ability hearing and, despite its hearsay character and an absence
of cross-examination, and despite the presence of opposing direct
medical testimony and testimony by the claimant himself, may
constitute substantial evidence supportive of a finding by the hear-
ing examiner adverse to the claimant, when the claimant has not
exercised his right to subpoena the reporting physician and thereby
provide himself with the opportunity for cross-examination of the
physician. 52
Justice Douglas dissented, with the concurrence of Justices Black and
Brennan, stating:
Review of the evidence is of no value to us. The vice is in the
procedure which allows it in without testing it by cross-examina-
tion. Those defending a claim look to defense-minded experts for
their salvation. Those who press for recognition of a claim look
to other experts. The problem of the law is to give advantage
to neither, but to let trial by ordeal of cross-examination distill
the truth.558
550. 288 F. Supp. 313, 314 (W.D. Tex. 1968).
551. 412 F.2d 44, 51 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 416 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1969).
552. 402 U.S. at 402.
553. Id. at 414. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
In some instances the courts have sent cases back to the Secretary of HEW
for the taking of testimony or for a rehearing. See, e.g., Concepcion v. Secretary of
HEW, 337 F. Supp. 899 (D.P.R. 1971) (testimony); Zeno v. Secretary of HEW,
.331 F. Supp. 1095 (D.P.R. 1970) (rehearing). In Zeno, Chief Judge Cancio in the
,course of his opinion commented:
Lack of representation by counsel at an administrative hearing such as this, is
not a denial of due process. . . . But this Court and other federal courts have
been troubled by this lack, even in civil matters, where a litigant with an
apparent just claim, needs a degree of sophistication in the presentation of
evidence, cross-examination and a knowledge of the existing case law, the statute,
and its legislative history, in order to present his case. It is, therefore, some-
what startling to read a record where it is established that the claimant has
,never gone to school; cannot read or write; where the question of a subsequent
fracture to the same leg is never clarified; where Vocational Rehabilitation has
not considered him qualified to train for any work other than the heavy labor
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U. Medicare and Medicaid
Medicare is a health insurance program that provides payment
for medical care to persons over 65 years of age," 4 while Medicaid
is a federal-state program designed to provide federal sharing of state
expenditures made in furnishing medical care to the needy of all
ages.55 In Martinez v. Richardson55 the Tenth Circuit held that due
process of law requires an evidentiary hearing before the discontinuance
of payments of medicare benefits.
Maxwell v. Wyman55 was a class suit by nursing homes that
participated in the New York Medicaid program and Medicaid re-
imbursement, but who failed to meet the fire and safety standards
indirectly imposed by the federal statutory scheme. The Second
Circuit ordered preliminary injunctive relief against the New York
Department of Social Services and Health to prevent them from
terminating medical reimbursement to the plaintiffs until a hearing had
been afforded on the question of whether, under applicable federal
regulations, waiver of compliance with the provisions of the Life and
Safety Code55 should be permitted.
he had previously done (and for which he is no longer qualified); where the
claimant does not know the place where he worked; and where a "vocational
expert" is the only witness called besides the plaintiff - and to expect this
humble individual to adequately cross-examine this expert, or to object to the
basis of his testimony like an experienced lawyer, puts him in a position of
having less than a fair hearing.
Id. at 1096 (citations and footnotes omitted).
554. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1970), as amended (Supp. II, 1972).
555. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970), as amended (Supp. II, 1972).
556. 472 F.2d 1121 (10th Cir. 1973).
557. 458 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1972). In Maxwell v. Wyman, 482 F.2d 1326 (2d.
Cir. 1973), the court ordered federal reimbursement to continue during a state court
stay, pending judicial review, of an order of the New York Department of Social
Services and Health decertifying certain nursing homes.
In Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), vacated, 412 U.S. 925 (1973), a federal three-judge district court found that
the refusal of Medicaid assistance for the performance of other than medically in-
dicated abortions deprived indigent pregnant women of the equal protection of the.
laws. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the cases for further
consideration in the light of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton,.
410 U.S. 179 (1973) (declaring state abortion laws unconstitutional).
In Diaz v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Fla. 1973), the court in-
validated a provision of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 13950(2) (B) (Supp.
1973), that disqualifies aliens except permanent residents who have resided here-
continuously for five years from enrollment in Medicare's medical insurance program
as violative of the due process clause of the fifth amendment
In Machado v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 357 F.
Supp. 890 (S.D. Fla. 1973), the court declared unconstitutional a Florida statute that:
limited participation in the Medicaid program to citizens and 20-year residents of the-
United States.
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V. Unemployment Compensation
Two discharged employees applied for and were ruled eligible for
unemployment insurance benefits under the California Unemployment
Insurance Program. Payments began immediately, but in each case
the former employer, after learning of the grant of benefits, filed an
appeal contending that payments should be denied because the claimants
had been discharged for cause. In accordance with the applicable
provision of the California Unemployment Insurance Code, payments
were automatically and immediately terminated. The Supreme Court,
however, in California Department of Human Resources v. Java559
held that enforcement of the provision should be enjoined since it was
inconsistent with the relevant provision of the Social Security Act.586
Chief Justice Burger stated:
Our reading of the statute imposes no hardship on either the
State or the employer and gives effect to the congressional ob-
jective of getting money into the pocket of the unemployed worker
at the earliest point that is administratively feasible. That is what
the Unemployment Insurance program was all about.561
The Court did not reach any constitutional issue. 562
Crow v. California Department of Human Resources"6" involved
the termination of unemployment compensation benefits without prior
hearing following a finding that the recipient, without good cause, had
refused to accept suitable employment. The plaintiff had been deprived
of benefits after a third party reported that she had refused to accept
a job. The district court, relying heavily upon Goldberg v. Kelly
564
and the district court opinion in Java v. California Department of
Human Resources,565 held the procedure violative of due process. The
court stated:
The Court now moves, perhaps cumbrously, to the ad hoc balancing
process utilized in recent cases of this sort. "[One's] constitu-
559. 402 U.S. 121 (1971); cf. Indiana Employment Security Div. v. Burney, 409
U.S. 540 (1973). But cf. Torres v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 405 U.S. 949
(1972).
560. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1) (1970).
561. 402 U.S. at 135 (footnotes omitted).
562. The three-judge district court had held the California scheme to be defec-
tive on both constitutional and statutory grounds. 317 F. Supp. 875, 879 (N.D. Cal.
1970). The court concluded that by not providing a termination hearing the scheme
violated the principles enunciated in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and
that by its application which resulted in an average 7 week delay in initial payments
to eligible claimants it violated the fundamental policy and intent of the Social Security
Act. Id.
563. 325 F. Supp. 1314 (N.D. Cal. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 924 (1972).
564. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
565. 317 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 121 (1971). While the
district court in Java based its decision on both constitutional and statutory grounds,
see note 562 supra, the Supreme Court, affirming, did not reach the constitutional issue.
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tional right to procedural due process entitles him to a quality
of hearing at least minimally proportioned to the gravity of what
he otherwise stands to lose through administrative fiat." While
engaging in this comparison of interests, we repeat that it is clear
that a pre-determination hearing, with the right to confront and
question witnesses is the constitutional norm, and not the excep-
tion, as defendants would imply, when "government action seri-
ously injures an individual," and where the crucial decision is
based upon facts alleged by a third party."'6
W. Government Subsidies and Grants
The federal government disburses billions of dollars annually in
subsidies and grants. According to Senator William Proxmire, chair-
man of the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government,
federal transportation subsidies cost the American people about $7
billion annually - the variety of subsidies for the maritime industry
alone cost the public almost $1 billion.5"'
In October 1972 the Federal Advisory Committee Act became
law." 8 Advisory committees are composed of non-governmental rep-
resentatives with some special expertise that can be utilized by the
agencies involved. Members range from groups of ranchers and other
land users, who advise state and national officers of the Bureau of Land
Management, to highly technical committees of the National Academy
of Sciences and the National Institutes of Health. The National In-
stitutes of Health alone have some 185 research and training grant
advisory committees.
569
One might well question whether due process requirements should
circumscribe the making of subsidies and grants or govern the actions
of advisory committees in recommending grants.
K. C. Wu, a Georgia college professor, applied to the National
Endowment for Humanities, a federal agency, for a $70,000 grant in
order to write a comprehensive history of China. Under the agency's
procedure, the application was referred, initially, to five experts on
Chinese history, each of whom was a professor of history at an
American university. It was then referred to a panel of outside experts
who consulted the Endowment for Humanities generally, but not neces-
566. 325 F. Supp. at 1318 (citations omitted). In Steinberg v. Fusari, 364 F. Supp.
922 (D. Conn. 1973), and Pregent v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security,
361 F. Supp. 782 (D.N.H. 1973), three-judge courts invalidated, on due process
grounds, state statutory provisions for terminating unemployment compensation. See
Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARv. L. REv. 1439, 1452 (1968).
567. N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1973, at 55, col. 4.
568. 5 U.S.C. App. I §§ 1-15 (Supp. II, 1972).
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sarily on Chinese history in particular, and later to a committee of
full-time staff members of the Endowment. Finally, the application
was referred to the National Council on Humanities, which rejected it.
Wu went to court under the Freedom of Information Act 5 7 0 to find
out what the five China specialists said. The district court denied relief
on the grounds that the information sought fell within an exemption
to the Act and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
571
In Mil-Ka-Ko Research & Development Corp. v. Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity 72 the plaintiffs, grantees of the OEO, sought
review of the OEO's refusal to refund their grant. Section 2944(3)
of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 provided that "financial
assistance ... shall not be terminated for failure to comply with appli-
cable terms and conditions unless the recipient agency has been afforded
reasonable notice and opportunity for a full and fair hearing." ' While
conceding that the original grant could not be curtailed in amount
or duration without a full, fair pretermination hearing, the court dis-
tinguished the denial of an application for refunding as "merely the
disappointment of a 'unilateral expectation' . . . unencumbered with the
constitutionally required burden of procedural due process. '  Finding
no property interest in receiving the refunding for the grant within
the meaning of the fifth amendment's prohibition against the taking
of property without due process of law, the court dismissed the action
since the agency had acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously. 575
X. Termination of Utility Services
In determining whether to apply due process concepts to the
termination of utility services, the courts first have had to consider
whether the utilities' acts constitute state action. The utilities, of course,
contend that in cutting off services they do not engage in state action.
The district court in Hattell v. Public Service Co.,576 in holding a
shutoff of utility services to be state action, stated:
When defending against a requirement for a minimal hearing
in advance of a utility shutoff, we are sure that all utility com-
panies share'the view that their conduct is not state action, but
570. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
571. Wu v. National Endowment for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030, 1032, 1034 (5th.
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1973).
572. 352 F. Supp. 169 (D.D.C. 1972).
573. 42 U.S.C. § 2944(3) (1970).
574. 352 F. Supp. at 173. Section 2944(2) provides that an application for refund-
ing shall not "be denied, unless the recipient agency has been given reasonable notice-
and opportunity to show cause why such action should not be taken." For a case
arising under this provision, see Monmouth Legal Servs. Organization v. Carlucci,
330 F. Supp. 985 (D.N.J. 1971).
575. 352 F. Supp. at 173.
576. 350 F. Supp. 240 (D. Cal. 1972).
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it all depends upon whose ox is being gored. When charged under
the anti-trust laws, utility companies vigorously argue that their
conduct is exempt because it is state action.57?
This view, however, has not been universally accepted. The
Seventh Circuit in Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.57 and Lucas
v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co.5 79 found that the utilities' conduct
did not constitute state action, while the Eighth Circuit took the oppo-
site view in Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co.580
In Lucas, an en banc decision, Circuit Judge Sprecher, in a dis-
senting opinion in which Chief Judge Swygert joined, stated:
I would hold that, prior to the discontinuance of power because
of a disputed account, the disputant is entitled to some kind of
hearing before an impartial arbiter other than representatives of
the public utility.
I would also hold that some notice reasonable in time and
adequate in content must clearly advise the customer that he has
the right to such a hearing if he disputes the charges leading to
the threatened disconnection. If he indicates his desire for the
hearing, obviously he would be entitled to further reasonable notice
as to the time and place of the hearing."8'
The majority of courts have held that the termination of utility
services does constitute state action and have ruled that the consumer
is entitled to some sort of notice and a hearing. In Bronson v.
Consolidated Edison Co.5" the district court poignantly wrote:
It has been clearly established that once the state has undertaken
to provide a service to the public, be it welfare or unemployment
benefits, drivers' licenses or tax exemptions, it must then comply
with the requirements of due process before it can terminate
access to such service or benefits in the case of any given individual.
This is the concept of the "entitlement," which provides the indi-
vidual with his only line of defense against arbitrary withdrawal
by the state of his access to what, although initially not his right
to demand, he has become dependent upon.
The courts ...have recognized the distressing realities of
the customer's plight. They have found that, more frequently
577. Id. at 245 (citations omitted).
578. 407 F.2d 624 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969).
579. 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
580. 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972).
581. 466 F.2d at 671. It should be noted that the court in Hattell did not feel it
proper to enunciate, as did the dissent in Lucas, what type of hearing would comport
with due process. 350 F. Supp. at 346.
582. 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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than not, the customer is confronted by an impersonal bureaucracy
held together by computers, wherein inefficiency and a resultant
high level of error are the norm, and unresponsiveness or "run-
arounds" the only answer to his inquiries.5
8
1
Y. Right to Buy a Drink
Many states have statutes which provide that designated persons
may post in liquor stores the names of individuals who are "excessive
drinkers." Sales or gifts of liquor are barred to such persons. The
Wisconsin version of this type of statute8 4 was held unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Constantineau,5 5 as violative
of the due process rights of those individuals whose names were posted.
The Court, per Justice Douglas, held: "Where a person's good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the govern-
ment is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essen-
tial."' Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black and Blackmun dis-
sented on the ground that the individual should have gone to the state
courts first.
Z. No-Action Letters
This Article has considered administrative and executive agencies
and officials as investigators and as adjudicators. It shall also consider
them as regulators. The no-action letters of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) bear some characteristics of adjudication, and
some of regulation.
If an individual wants to embark upon a course of conduct, but
is uncertain as to whether such proposed course is in violation of the
applicable securities law and regulations, he may write to the SEC,
describe his proposed course of conduct, and request a no-action
583. Id. at 447-48 (citations and footnotes omitted) ; accord, Palmer v. Columbia
Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973);
Stamford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972); cf. Davis v. Weir,
328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971); 359 F. Supp. 1023 (N.D. Ga. 1973). Contra,
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 483 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1973) ("Simply stated,
we do not find that a right to receive utility services pending resolution of a dispute
between a customer and the company is protected by the Constitution of the United
States." Id. at 762.).
See Note, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process in Terminations of Utility
Services for Nonpayment, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1477 (1973).
An example of the possible effects of a utility determination to terminate
service has recently been in the news. The Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
turned off an elderly couple's electricity for nonpayment of a $202 electric bill. The
couple froze to death. Officials and civic groups launched investigations to determine
whether criminal negligence and violations of the state utility regulations were
involved. N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1973, at 24, col. 1.
584. Law of May 9, 1945, ch. 124, [1945] Laws of Wis. 209, as amended Law
of June 2, 1953, ch. 235, [1953] Laws of Wis. 209 (repealed 1972).
585. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
586. Id. at 437.
[VOL. 19: p. 197
46
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/is 2/1
ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
position. At one time whether these no-action letters and the responses
should be made available for public inspection was an issue. However,
in October 1970 the SEC adopted new regulations providing that no-
action and interpretative letters, and the responses thereto, are to be
made available for public inspection or copying 30 days after the staff
has given or sent the responses to the persons requesting them.
5 87
In particular cases where it appears that a further delay in publication
will be appropriate, the letter and response will be given confidential




Administrative officials sometimes have discretion in the granting
of corporate charters, such as those of banks and certain membership
corporations. The Comptroller of the currency, for example, approves
national bank charters. When a state bank was denied permission to
open another bank by state authorities, it converted to a national bank
and obtained the desired permission from the Comptroller. In Wood
County Bank v. Camp 9 a competitor state bank filed suit contending
that the Comptroller had acted unlawfully in failing to make findings
of fact and to render a reasoned opinion disclosing the legal and
factual bases for his action. The Comptroller responded that he never
made such findings and further that he considered that he had no
obligation to do so. The court in concluding that the Comptroller had
acted in violation of the plaintiff's due process rights stated:
In the light of this finding that the hearing held was ad-
judicatory rather than legislative, due process requires that findings
of fact be made in support of any conclusion or decision made as
a consequence of said hearing. No such findings were made in zhis
case, hence, the approval of the Comptroller was made unlawfully
and is without legal effect. 590
Camp v. Pitts59 was a suit to compel the issuance of a national
bank charter which the Comptroller had denied after a determination
that the market area of the proposed bank was adequately served by
587. 17 C.F.R. § 200.81(a) (1973).
588. Id. § 200.81 (b). Further similar areas suggest themselves: e.g., letter rulings
and advice memoranda of the Internal Revenue Service; procedures by which business
firms may obtain Justice Department advice as to whether the proposed transaction
will be challenged under antitrust laws. In Tax Analysts and Advocates v. IRS, 362
F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973), the court held that the Freedom of Information Act
required disclosure of letter rulings and technical advice memoranda. The Justice
Department recently revised its business review procedure. See 42 U.S.L.W. 2316
(Antitrust Division Directive No. 14-73, Dec. 11, 1973).
589. 348 F. Supp. 1321 (D.D.C. 1972).
590. Id. at 1325.
591. 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
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existing banks.5" 2 The district court, in granting summary judgment
for the Comptroller, held the Comptroller's decision was neither arbi-
trary nor capricious and was based on substantial evidence. 593 The
Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court
for a trial de novo because the Comptroller had failed to state the
basis of his decision in the record. 0 4 The Supreme Court in turn
vacated the judgment of the Fourth Circuit and remanded the case
to the agency where, by affidavits or testimony, the record could be
made sufficient for the purpose of judicial review.5"5
BB. Intermediate Agency Action
Given that an individual is entitled to notice and a hearing before
administrative or executive adjudication, two related questions remain.
First, at what point in the adjudicatory process may the right be
demanded, and, second, may an individual demand and be accorded
more than one hearing? It would appear that one fair and adequate
hearing before adjudication will suffice. As the Supreme Court stated
in Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator :"9"
The demands of due process do not require a hearing, at the
initial state or at any particular point or at more than one point
in an administrative proceeding so long as the requisite hearing is
held before the final order becomes effective.59
In United States v. Goldstein9" the defendant taxpayer claimed
that he was entitled to a series of four conferences at various adminis-
trative levels before criminal charges against him could be presented
to the grand jury, that denial of these conferences was arbitrary, and,
therefore, that he had been deprived of due process and equal protection
of the laws. The court rejected both constitutional arguments conclud-
ing: (1) denial of the pre-indictment conference did not violate due
process as the petitioner's rights would be fully protected at trial ;..
and (2) in the absence of invidious class discrimination, the selection
by the government prosecutor of any particular case for prosecution
was not a denial of equal protection of the laws."°
592. Id. at 138-39.
593. 329 F. Supp. 1302, 1308 (D.S.C. 1971).
594. 463 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1972).
595. 411 U.S. at 142-43.
596. 312 U.S. 126 (1941).
597. Id. at 152-53.
598. 342 F. Supp. 661 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); cf. United States v. Patterson, 465 F.2d
360 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1038 (1972).
599. 342 F. Supp. at 666-67.
600. Id. at 668.
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There is one area of administrative or executive action where the
courts hesitate to tread - agency discretion. Indeed, the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act specifically provides that the courts are not to
step in where "agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law." '' This exception touches the thesis of this article.
The best as well as the oldest example of uncontrolled agency
discretion is the exercise of the power for the remission or mitigation
of forfeitures, fines, or penalties. Both the Attorney General of the
United States as well as the Secretary of the Treasury have such
power.6 12 Moreover, statutes granting such power date to 1790,603
almost to the beginning of our government. Yet the courts have refused
to harness the exercise of this power.
Illustrative of the approach of the courts in this area is United
States v. One 1961 Cadillac,604 a case which involved the forfeiture of an
automobile allegedly used in the transportation of narcotics. The Sixth
Circuit in denying relief to General Motors Acceptance Corporation
declared:
The purpose of the remission statutes was to grant executive
power to relieve against the harshness of forfeitures. The exercise
of the power, however, was committed to the discretion of the
executive so that he could temper justice with mercy or leniency.
Remitting the forfeiture, however, constituted an act of grace.
The courts have not been granted jurisdiction to control the action
of the executive, even where it is alleged, as here, in general con-
clusory language, that discretion has been abused.
605
In a more recent case, Bramble v. Kleindienst,0 6 the plaintiff, seek-
ing injunctive and declaratory relief as well as damages, attacked the
constitutionality of a forfeiture statute. The court noted that once the
plaintiff had elected an administrative remedy, via a petition for re-
mission or mitigation of a forfeiture, the court no longer had juris-
diction, since the matter was committed to agency discretion by law.
60 7
601. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970).
602. 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1970); 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1970).
603. See, e.g., Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122.
604. 337 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1964).
605. Id. at 733.
606. 357 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Colo. 1973).
607. Id. at 1033.
The Supreme Court in United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401
U.S. 715 (1971), gave relief, but did so by limiting the scope of the forfeiture statute
there involved, saying through Justice Harlan: "When forfeiture statutes are viewed
in their entirety, it is manifest that they are intended to impose a penalty only upon
those who are significantly involved in a criminal enterprise." Id. at 722 (footnotes
omitted). The Sixth Circuit, in McKeehan v. United States, 438 F.2d 739 (6th
Cir. 1971), has given relief on comparable grounds.
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The above decisions to the contrary notwithstanding, this writer
can see no substantial reason why the courts should not develop a
common law to circumscribe the exercise of the power of executive
officials to remit or mitigate forfeitures.
There are other areas of executive or administrative discretion
in which the courts have hesitated to tread. Just as prosecutors have
an almost unreviewable discretion as to whom they shall prosecute,
so the courts have given the general counsel of administrative agencies
a like discretion as to the complaints they shall bring. For example,
in Vaca v. Sipese°l the Court remarked that the NLRB's general
counsel "has unreviewable discretion to refuse to institute an unfair
labor practice complaint." 6°°
Comparably, in Butz v. Glover Livestock Commission Co."'0
the Court reversed the judgment of the Tenth Circuit that had set aside
a 20-day suspension by the Secretary of Agriculture of a stockyard
operator for short weighing. Justice Stewart, in a dissent in which
Justice Douglas joined, wrote rather sharply:
The reversal today of a wholly defensible Court of Appeals
judgment accomplishes two unfortunate results. First, the Court
moves administrative decisionmaking one step closer to un-
reviewability, an odd result at a time when serious concern is
being expressed about the fairness of agency justice. Second, the
Court serves notice upon the federal judiciary to be wary indeed
of venturing to correct administrative arbitrariness."'
An illustration of the harm inherent in allowing agency discretion
to go unchecked occurred in what has become known as the Tuskegee
Study, a controversial federal syphilis experiment. The study, initiated
in 1932 and sponsored by the United States Public Health Service, a
division of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, ended
after public disclosure of the program in the summer of 1972. Con-
ducted among poor rural black men in Macon County, Alabama, more
than 430 men, all with syphilis, were never given treatment for the
disease so that doctors could study what damage untreated syphilis
does to the human body. At least 28 of the men died as a direct result
of untreated syphilis.6 12
Another example of inherent harm in allowing agency discretion
to go unchecked is the sterilization of welfare mothers. As a result of
608. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
609. Id. at 182; accord, Braden v. Herman, 468 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.denied, 411 U.S. 916 (1973); Terminal Freight Cooperative Ass'n v. NLRB, 447F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
610. 411 U.S. 182 (1973), rev'g 454 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1972?.
611. 411 U.S. at 191 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
612. See N.Y. Times, June 13, 1973, at 21, col. 3.
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charges that in some cases such sterilizations were involuntary,
1 8
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Casper W. Weinberger,
ordered a freeze on federal funds that might be used for involuntary
sterilizations until detailed guidelines for such operations could be
put into effect.614
The past year has seen the impounding or withholding of funds,
authorized to be spent by Congress, by executive and administrative
officials. In this area the courts have usually given relief. The district
court in Berends v. Butz6" 5 decided that the Secretary of Agriculture's
unilateral termination of the Federal Emergency Loan Program in
Minnesota, without notice to the affected farmers, was in violation
of the statutes that established the program, of administrative regula-
tions, and of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Penn-
sylvania v. Lynn 16 involved programs providing federal subsidies for
low and moderate income housing projects. In January 1973 the
Administration ordered them halted for the stated purpose of reevalu-
ating the entire housing program; however, the programs were never
resumed during the fiscal year that ended June 30 and the White
House did not seek any refinancing for them for the 1973-1974 fiscal
year. The court concluded: "It is not within the discretion of the
Executive to refuse to execute laws passed by Congress but with
which the Executive presently disagrees. '"617 Again, in Campaign Clean
Water, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus,6 18 the court, although conceding that the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency had some dis-
cretion to allot less than the full $11 billion appropriated by Congress
for the construction of sewage treatment plants, held that he did not
have discretion to allot $6 billion less. Although refusing to supervise
the Administrator in the future administration of appropriations,
the court concluded that the withholding of 55 per cent of the total
allotment was a flagrant abuse of administrative discretion which, in
effect, negated the purpose of the authorization, and thus entered a
613. See, e.g., Kovach, Sterilization Consent Not Given, Father Tells Kennedy's
Panel, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1973, at 16, col. 1.
614. See N.Y. Times, July 12, 1973, at 38, col. 1.
615. 357 F. Supp. 143 (D. Minn. 1973). See Keefe & Jorgensen, Georgia Marches
North Against Executive Impoundment, 59 A.B.A.J. 1319 (1973), and cases
cited therein.
616. 362 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973).
617. Id. at 1372.
In the City of New York v. Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973),
the court concluded that the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
had discretion to monitor the rate of spending at the obligation stage but not at the
allotment stage.
618. 361 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Va. 1973).
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declaratory judgment holding the instant controversial policy null
and void.6 19
A final example of court intervention in an agency's policy of
withholding authorized funds occurred in a suit filed by the National
Council of Community Health Centers.62° The court ordered HEW
to release more than $52 million in impounded funds intended to
establish community mental health centers. The government argued
that the President had political discretion not to spend money appro-
priated by Congress. The court rejected that line of reasoning, con-
cluding the intent of the appropriation was to remedy the vast mental
health needs of the nation. With that intent before it, the court
determined that Congress wanted the full amount of funds appropriated
to be dispensed.1
21
There have been instances in which the courts have attempted
to restrict and even to harness the agency discretion exception. In
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,62 2 petitioners claimed
that the Secretary of Transportation violated the provisions of federal
statutes by authorizing the expenditure of federal funds for the construc-
tion of a six-lane interstate highway through Overton Park in Memphis,
Tennessee. Overton Park, located near the center of Memphis, con-
tained a zoo, a nine-hole municipal golf course, an outdoor threatre,
nature trails, a bridle path, an art academy, picnic areas, and 170 acres
of forest. The proposed highway would have severed the zoo from
the rest of the park. The Supreme Court determined that the Secre-
tary's decision did not fall within the agency discretion exception.
62
3
The exception, the Court continued, was applicable only where "statutes
are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law
to apply." '624 Since by specific statutory direction,625 the Secretary
could not approve a project which required the taking of public park-
land unless no feasible and prudent alternative existed, the agency
did not have unbridled discretion, but was indeed subject to judicial
619. Id. at 691.
620. National Council of Community Mental Health Centers v. Weinberger, 361
F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1973).
621. Id. at 901-02.
622. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
623. Id. at 410.
624. Id. citing S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945). The Court cited
Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965 (1969); Berger,
Administrative Arbitrariness: A Sequel, 51 MINN'. L. REV. 601 (1967); Davis,
Administrative Arbitrariness Is Not Always Reviewable, 51 MINN. L. REV. 643
(1967); Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed To
Agency Discretion," 82 H~Av. L. REV. 367 (1968).
625. Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970); Department of Trans-
portation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
[VOL. 19: p. 197248.
52
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/1
ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
review. Thus, the Court remanded the case to the district court for
plenary review of the Secretary's decision.
Peoples v. United States Department of Agriculture26 involved
an action by a number of poor Alabama families against the Depart-
ment of Agriculture and others, raising various statutory and constitu-
tional objections to the way in which the defendants were administering
the Food Stamp Act of 1964,62 the Commodities Distribution Pro-
gram,628 and the Agriculture Act of 1969.29 While the district court
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked
standing, the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. On appeal, in
addition to standing, the defendants argued that the district court
did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims
because the matter was one committed to the non-reviewable discretion
of the Secretary. The court of appeals did not consider it appropriate
to rule on the argument. 3 ° However, in a supplemental opinion issued
on petition for rehearing, the court noted that its decision was made
in the context of the general rule that although an agency's discretion
may be broad, its decisions are subject to judicial review for arbitrari-
ness or abuse of discretion, except in those limited areas where Congress
has specifically made certain issues non-reviewable to prevent con-
fidential information from appearing in the public record.6"'
In addition to the deference courts may accord agency discretion,
there are what the courts denote as withdrawal statutes which specifi-
cally exempt certain agency action from judicial review. The Admin-
istrative Procedure Act itself provides that it does not apply when
"statutes preclude judicial review."6 ' Illustrative is a section of the
act which created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. This
section, which deals among other things with the disciplining of in-
sured banks, their officers, directors and others, provides that "except
as otherwise provided in this section no court shall have jurisdiction
to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of
any notice or order under this section or to review, modify, suspend,
terminate, or set aside any such notice or order. 6 31 Under this section
the Comptroller of the Currency summarily prohibited a stockholder
626. 427 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
627. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-25 (1970).
628. Id. § 612c.
629. Id. § 1431.
630. 427 F.2d at 566.
631. Id. at 567; cf. Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (involving DDT) ("Although the FIFRA provides that the Secretary
'may' suspend the registration of an economic poison that creates an imminent hazard
to the public, we conclude that his decision is not thereby placed beyond judicial
scrutiny." Id. at 1098).
632. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1970).
633. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) (1970).
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from participating in the affairs of a national bank because of a
1965 felony conviction and took the position, in Manges v. Camp,6"
that the court did not have jurisdiction to review his order. The
Fifth Circuit disagreed on the ground that he had exceeded his statutory
authority, stating:
There is, however, a very strong court created exception to with-
drawal statutes. This exception comes into play when there has
been a clear departure from statutory authority, and thereby
exposes the offending agency to review of administrative action
otherwise made unreviewable by statute.
635
A good illustration of what the courts can do if so inclined may
be seen in Jeffries v. Olesen,636 a case which involved a fraud complaint
filed by the solicitor for the Post Office Department. A hearing was
set before a hearing examiner in Washington, D.C. The individual
against whom the complaint was directed lived in Los Angeles and
asked that the hearing be held there bacause he could not leave his
polio afflicted wife unattended, and, in addition, was financially unable
to bring witnesses to Washington. His request was denied, despite
the fact that an applicable regulation provided: "The hearing examiner
shall grant or deny such application having due regard for the con-
venience and necessity of the parties. 637 The hearing was held without
him and the fraud order issued. The United States District Court
for the Southern District of California, at the defendant's request, held
the fraud order void. The court described a fair hearing in this manner:
The "fair" hearing essential to meet minimum requirements of
any accepted notion of due process includes not only rudimentary
fairness in the conduct of the hearing when and where held, but
also a reasonably fair opportunity to be present at the time and
place fixed, to cross-examine any opposing witnesses, to offer
evidence, and to be heard at least briefly in defense.6 "3
The court went on to hold that the violation of an administrative
regulation was itself a violation of due process - even though the
regulation went beyond statutory or constitutional requirements:
Violation of valid administrative regulations, even by the admin-
istrator himself, constitutes in legal effect a violation of the
statute. . . .And where administrative regulations set a higher
standard of procedural due process than that required by the
634. 474 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1973).
635. Id. at 99.
636. 121 F. Supp. 463 (S.D. Cal. 1954). It should be noted that no withdrawal
statute was applicable.
637. 39 C.F.R. § 150.414(b) (1954).
638. 121 F. Supp. at 475 (citations omitted).
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Constitution or the statute, violation amounts to a denial of
administratively-established due process of law. 39
Counsel for private clients confronted with a claim of the agency
discretion exception should check to determine whether the admin-
istrative official is acting beyond the scope of the statute, outside the
area of his discretion, violating an applicable regulation, conducting
himself arbitrarily, or abusing his discretion. If the remission or
mitigation of a forfeiture is involved, counsel should urge the courts
to develop a common law to compel reasonable administrative action.
Possibly counsel should even be so bold as to suggest that statutes
which preclude judicial review of agency action are themselves viola-
tive of the due process clause of the fifth amendment in the case of
federal statutes, and of the fourteenth amendment in the case of state
statutes. Counsel can cite the early English cases in which the judges
relied upon the common law, not only to control acts of the crown,
but even acts of Parliament.64 °
DD. Membership Organizations
Heretofore this Article has examined the courts' approach to
executive and administrative bodies and officials. One might question
whether the courts will next proceed to apply due process concepts to
other bodies that exert a large measure of control over the lives of
many of us. Will the courts, for instance, step in and apply due
process concepts to various membership organizations such as political
parties, economic groups, labor unions, stock exchanges, Veteran's
associations, religious organizations, and professional societies? Of
course, if these groups act in violation of their constitution or by-laws,
or practice discrimination, the courts will give relief. Yet, the question
is whether the courts will give due process relief. They have begun
to do so.
In an interesting state case, Van Daele v. Vinci,6 41 the Supreme
Court of Illinois gave due process relief to retail grocers who had
been expelled from membership in a grocery cooperative because of
lack of impartiality of the cooperative's board, even though the board
followed the procedure set out in the cooperative's by-laws for dis-
ciplinary hearings.
639. Id. at 476 (citations omitted).
640. For an account, see Rogge, Williams v. Florida, End of A Theory (pt. 1),
16 ViLL. L. REv. 411, 442-43, 446-47 (1971). In Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638
(KB. 1610), Coke declared: "And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the
common law will control Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be
utterly void . . . ." Id. at 652.
641. 51 Ill. 2d 389, 282 N.E.2d 728, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1007 (1972).
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Perhaps the most discussed situation to date involved the power
of the Democratic Party to exclude from its 1972 national convention
certain challenged delegates from California and Illinois. The Cali-
fornia delegates were selected in a "winner-take-all" primary. The
District of Columbia Circuit in Brown v. O'Brien.42 ruled in their
favor, reasoning:
The decision of the Party to exclude these 151 delegates, who
were elected in compliance with each of the party's applicable
rules then in force, jeopardizes the integrity of the election process,
and it therefore injures every voter in the United States and
every individual and institution which is subject to the authority
of the President. Because we are convinced that the process of
electing the President of the United States is not, and cannot be,
placed outside the rule of law, we set aside the arbitrary and
unconstitutional action of the Democratic Party. 43
The Supreme Court first granted a stay and subsequently vacated
the judgment and remanded the case for a determination whether
it had become moot. 644  When the case returned, the District of
Columbia Circuit agreed that the case was not moot. However, the
majority felt that there was then no equitable basis upon which either
it or the district court could grant declaratory or injunctive relief.645
American labor unions have also found themselves subject to
the expanding reach of administrative due process. George Hardeman,
a member of the Boilermaker's Union, brought suit against the union
after he was expelled for allegedly assaulting a business manager whom
he felt had discriminated against him in job referrals. Hardeman
charged the union with violating section 101(a) (5) of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, which provides that "no
642. 469 F.2d 563 (D.C. Cir.), stay granted, 409 US. 1 (1972), vacated, 409 U.S.
816 (1972), and sub nom. Keane v. National Democratic Party, 409 U.S. 816 (1972).
643. 469 F.2d at 570.
644. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Brown v. O'Brien and remanded
with directions to dismiss as moot. 409 U.S. at 816. However, in Keane v. National
Democratic Party, 469 F.2d 563 (D.C. Cir. 1972), a case decided by the District of
Columbia Circuit contemporaneously with O'Brien, the Court, while vacating the
judgment, remanded with directions to determine whether the case had become moot.
409 U.S. at 816.
645. Keane v. National Democratic Party, ._- F.2d , -_ (D.C. Cir. 1973).
In Briscoe v. Kusper, 435 F.2d 1046 (7th Cir. 1970), the Seventh Circuit was
faced with a class action brought by candidates and registered voters seeking declara-
tory judgment with reference to the constitutionality of the manner in which new
practices of the city Board of Elections commissioners for processing objections to
aldermanic nominating petitions was instituted. The court held that the board's appli-
cation of a new anti-duplication rule to nullify previously acceptable aldermanic
nominating petitions without prior notice to candidates, together with its action of
striking signatures which failed to include middle initials, even if the signature was
genuine and verifiable by reference to registration lists, without forewarning candi-
dates of its technical interpretation of the statute which stated qualified voters must
sign in their own proper persons only, constituted denial of due process of law.
[VOL. 19: p. 197
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member ... may be fined, suspended, expelled or otherwise disciplined
except for nonpayment of dues unless such member has been (A)
served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to
prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing.""64 Judgment
was granted Hardeman and was- affirmed per curiam by the Fifth
Circuit.6 47 The Supreme Court, however, reversed 648 stating per Justice
Brennan:
We think that this is sufficient to indicate that § 101 (a) (5)
was not intended to authorize courts to determine the scope 'f
offenses for which a union may discipline its members. And if a
union may discipline its members for offenses not prescribed by
written rules at all, it is surely a futile exercise for a court to
construe the written rules in order to determine whether particular
conduct falls within or without their scope.
49
Justice Douglas, dissenting, expressed the view that although a union
had more leeway than an administrative agency, it did not have as
much leeway as the majority gave it:
I agree that a court does not sit in review of a union as it
does of an administrative agency. But by reason of § 101 (a) (5)
judicial oversight is much more than procedural; it provides in
subsection (C) for "a full and fair hearing." Even if every
conceivable procedural guarantee is provided, a hearing is not
"fair" when all substantive rights are stripped away to reach a
preordained result. If there is to be a "fair hearing" there must,
I submit, be some evidence directed to the charges to support
the conclusion. 650
During its 1972-1973 term, the Court, in three cases, passed on
the legality of union fines imposed upon members or former members.
In two, NLRB v. Textile Workers"5' and Booster Lodge No. 405 v.
NLRB,652 the Court held that unions could not fine strikebreakers who
had lawfully resigned from their unions during the strike period but
later returned to work. However, in the third case, NLRB v. Boeing
Co., 5' the Court ruled that even under section 8(b) (1) (A) of the
646. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1970).
647. Hardeman v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 420 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.
1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 233 (1971).
648. International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233 (1971).
649. Id. at 244-45 (footnotes omitted).
650. Id. at 250 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
651. 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
652. 412 U.S. 84 (1973).
653. 412 U.S. 67 (1973). Contra, Morton Salt Co. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 416 (9th
Cir. 1972), petition for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3609 (U.S. May 7, 1973) (No. 72-
1502); O'Reilly v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1972), petition for cert. filed, 41
U.S.L.W. 3509 (U.S. Mar. 6, 1973) (No. 72-1210).
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National Labor Relations Act, 54 relating to unfair labor practices, the
NLRB did not have power to inquire into the reasonableness of dis-
ciplinary fines which a union imposed. Justice Douglas again dissented,
this time with the concurrence of the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun.
In the last paragraph of his dissent, Douglas wrote persuasively:
It is said that Congress has provided the Board with no guidelines
for passing on the "reasonableness" of union-imposed fines. But
the Board through case-by-case treatment has been developing
an administrative common law concerning "unfair" practices of
employers and unions alike. . . . A fine discretely related to a
legitimate union need and reflecting principled motivations under
the law is one thing. A fine that reflects the raw power exercised
by a union in its hunger for all-pervasive authority over members
is quite another problem. The Labor Board, which knows the
nuances of this problem better than any other tribunal, is the
keeper of the conscience under the Act. It and it alone has primary
responsibility to police unions, as well as employers, in protection
of the rights of workers. In my view it cannot properly perform
its duties under § 8(b) (1) (A) unless it determines whether the
nature and amount of the fine levied by a union constitute an
unfair labor practice.
655
Of course, if a union engages in discrimination the courts will
give relief. In NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp.65
there was evidence that the union discriminated against blacks. The
Eighth Circuit decided that the remedial machinery of the National
Labor Relations Act was not available to a union which was unwilling
to correct past practices of discrimination, stating:
Federal complicity through recognition of a discriminating union
serves not only to condone the discrimination, but in effect legiti-
mnizes and perpetuates such invidious practices. Certainly such
a degree of federal participation in the maintenance of racially dis-
criminatory practices violates basic constitutional tenets.65'
Thus, although the court agreed with the NLRB that the defendant
company was in fact guilty of an unfair labor practice in refusing to
bargain, it refused to enforce the Board's order unless the union could
show a lack of discrimination on remand.65 8
In Jones v. United States Secretary of Defensee 9 several re-
servists, who were not in sympathy with the political views of the
654. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970).
655. 412 U.S. at 83 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
656. 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973).
657. Id. at 477.
658. Id.
659. 346 F. Supp. 97 (D. Minn. 1972).
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Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), and who supported the candidacy
of George McGovern, sought a temporary restraining order relieving
them from the requirement of marching in a parade in connection with
a VFW convention. Former Vice President Agnew, whose candidacy
the plaintiffs alleged the convention was advancing, was to address the
convention. The Court denied a temporary restraining order, but added
several conditions to its denial, including a prohibition against conduct-
ing the parade contemporaneously with the appearance of any candidate
for the presidency or vice presidency.6 '
Members of stock exchanges, involved in disciplinary proceedings,
also have taken their respective exchanges to court with due process
claims. In Crimmins v. American Stock Exchange, Inc.6"' the court,
although ruling against the right to counsel in that case, nevertheless
said:
We think that the day is long gone when a national stock exchange
can be considered a private club when it conducts disciplinary pro-
ceedings against its members or their employees. When an ex-
change conducts such proceedings under the self-regulatory power
conferred upon it by the 1934 Act, it is engaged in governmental
action, federal in character, and the Act imposed upon it the
requirement that it comply with fundamental standards of fair
play.
662
In Villani v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc. 66 3 counsel for the Ex-
change advised the court by letter that the Board of Governors of the
Exchange approved various recommendations to change the hearing
procedures and disciplinary proceedings conducted by the Exchange.
In a subsequent letter, counsel reported that both the SEC and the
membership of the exchange had approved the recommendations, one
of which abolished the Exchange's "no-counsel rule":
A person, firm or corporation shall have the right to be
represented by legal or other counsel in any hearing and review
thereof held pursuant to the provisions of this Article and in any
investigation before any committee, officer or employee of the
Exchange authorized by the Board of Directors.66 4
660. Id. at 100.
661. 346 F. Supp. 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
662. Id. at 1259.
663. 348 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
664. Id. at 1189, quoting § 23, Article XIV of the Constitution of the New York
Stock Exchange. For other recent cases, pro and con, involving membership organi-
zations, see, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (New
York Stock Exchange could not deny to two Texas over-the-counter broker-dealers
direct wire connections without the notice and hearing that they requested. "The
basic nature of the rights which we hold to be required under the antitrust laws in
the circumstances of today's decision is indicated by the fact that public agencies,
labor unions, clubs, and other associations have, under various legal principles, all
been required to afford notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to answer charges to
one who is about to be denied a valuable right." Id. at 364 n.17) ; Schonfeld v.
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EE. Private Entities with a Public Interest
Akin to the membership organizations discussed above are private
entities with a public interest: private colleges and schools, private
hospitals, private corporations, societies, and associations. In this area
the courts have made little progress in applying due process concepts
to official action. The older view with reference to private colleges and
schools, was that the relations between a student and a private university
were a matter of contract.6" 5 This view is still with us. The question
which the courts must address is whether there is enough governmental
contact to bring the individual within the protection of the due process
clauses. In a recent case, Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School,66  the
district court held that a private law school's dismissal of anti-war
activists was not state action, notwithstanding that the school operated
under a charter granted by the state, occupied a site acquired from
the city under conditions favorable to the school, received subsidies
from the state for each graduate student as well as for physically dis-
abled students, and was regulated by rules of the New York Court of
Appeals concerning the admission of attorneys. The court reasoned:
The dichotomy between public and private education was
spawned by Chief Justice Marshall in Dartmouth College Trustees
v. Woodward. Many changes have occurred in educational sys-
tems since that time and now numerous private institutions are
dependent in varying degrees on governmental assistance. Perhaps
these institutions should be subject to closer regulation because
Penza, 477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973) (union's action in removing official from office
and declaring him ineligible to run in interim election was part of a deliberate effort
to suppress dissent): Local Union 13410 v. UMW, 475 F.2d 906 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
("Absent a reasonable belief in the necessity for immediate action, all practical steps
must be taken to afford a hearing before a trusteeship is imposed." Id. at 915);
Semancik v. UMW, 466 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1972) ("Requiring unions to limit their
prosecutions to constitutional provisions and by-laws which reasonably inform union
members of the nature of the proscribed activity is a logical extension of the require-
ment of a full and fair hearing in accordance with due process. . . . A tribunal of
the political opponents of those on trial offends our most basic notions of fairness."
Id. at 157) ; Reyes v. Laborers' International Union, 464 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 915 (1973) (union's findings at the disciplinary hearing are
to be sustained "if supported by any evidence produced at the disciplinary trial con-
ducted by an unbiased trial body which afforded a fair and impartial determination
of guilt." Id. at 597) (footnotes omitted) ; Intercontinental Industries, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Stock Exchange, 452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972) (delist-
ing proceeding accorded due process) : Evans v. American Federation of Television &
Radio Artists, 354 F. Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (compulsion to join union and
submit to union discipline was a chilling of the first amendment rights of radio-
television commentators M. Stanton Evans and William F. Buckley, Jr.); Stears v.
Veterans of Foreign Wars, 353 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1972) (Veterans of Foreign
Wars may limit its membership to men, since constitutional chartering of the organi-
zation is not significant state involvement violative of equal protection).
665. See, e.g., Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435
(4th Dep't 1928).
666. __ F. Supp .... (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973).
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of their reliance on governmental grants, but the requirements of
academic freedom counsel caution on extending such control.66 7
In Powe v. Miles,66 Circuit Judge Friendly, in his opinion for
the Second Circuit, "split" Alfred University into two parts, finding
one portion to be under the fourteenth amendment and the other to
be free from state action. The university, a private college in the
state of New York, operated a ceramics school on its campus under
contract from the state. The court held that the ceramics school, op-
erated only pursuant to the contract with the state, was subject to
the fourteenth amendment to the same extent as if it were a state school.
As to students of Alfred University who were not attending the
ceramics school, however, the court found insufficient state action to
apply the fourteenth amendment to student disciplinary procedures.
In another recent decision, Ryan v. Hofstra University,"' the
court took a broader view of the governmental contacts required to
bring due process considerations into play and stated:
Hofstra University, though termed a "private" university,
cannot expel, bar and fine a student without following fair and
reasonable procedures. It cannot be arbitrary. It must abide by
constitutional principles of fair conduct implicit in our societY
The student in question, a Hofstra freshman in the spring of 1971,
allegedly was involved in three rock-throwing incidents, and was also
a leader in student protests against tuition increases. He was called
before a disciplinary committee composed of three staff members ap-
pointed by the dean. The committee also spoke with a school psy-
chologist and the chief security officer, and considered the statement of
a security policeman. The dean subsequently levied a fine and expelled
the student. The court decided that the student's expulsion was (1)
unconstitutional and (2) Hofstra had failed to follow its own rules. In
reaching the conclusion that the private status of Hofstra University
was not very significant in determining the applicability of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the court reasoned:
The university is replete with public interest, requirement and
supervision. The university is in the most real comparable sense
a public trust for the rendition of education. It is only for this
667. Id. (citation omitted); accord, Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hospital, 479 F.2d
756 (7th Cir. 1973) (private hospitals may bar abortions); Ward v. St. Anthony
Hosp., 476 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1973) (private non-profit hospital); Hines v. Cenla
Community Action Comm., Inc., 474 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1973) (community action
agency) ; Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967).
668. 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
669. 67 Misc. 2d 651, 324 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971).
670. Id. at 653, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
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reason that so much public wealth and effort have been supplied
to it.
A private university like Hofstra is an oligarchical form
tending to be self-perpetuating. Its fundamental legal responsi-
bilities are to the public. Its existence and favored position can
be justified only as a public stewardship.
671
The question, whether there is enough governmental involvement
in the affairs of a private entity for the courts to consider extending
the concept of due process to the entity's actions, has arisen in various
fields. In Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Society, 72 for example, the Second
Circuit held that the activities of the Legal Aid Society in New York
City did not constitute state action, since the society's history, consti-
tution, by-laws, organization, and management showed that it was an
independent private institution. On the other hand, however, in Falcone
v. Middlesex County Medical Society,6 7 3 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that a county medical society acted in an arbitrary, un-
reasonable, and illegal manner in refusing to admit a duly licensed
and registered physician, who met all qualifications prescribed in
the society's written by-laws, because of an unwritten requirement of
four years' attendance at an American Medical Association approved
medical college. The court carefully distinguished "fraternal organiza-
tions" whose function is social, civic, or political, from organizations
in which membership was an "economic necessity" to the individual."7'
The latter organizations, the court noted:
must be particularly alert to the need for truly protecting the
welfare and advancing the interests of justice by reasonably safe-
guarding the individual's opportunity for earning a livelihood




An interesting situation arose during a football game in October
1972 between Tulane and Miami. Miami scored the game winning
touchdown on an illegal fifth down, allowed because the official linesman
lost count of the downs. Subsequently, David Nelson, Secretary of
671. Id. at 666, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 981. Subsequently, the court reviewed the pro-
cedure the university intended to use in disciplinary proceedings against the student
and, with modifications, expressed its approval. 68 Misc. 2d 890, 328 N.Y.S.2d 339
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972).
672. 445 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1971).
673. 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
674. Id. at 591-92, 170 A.2d at 796-97.
675. Id. at 592, 170 A.2d at 797; accord, Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53
Hawaii 495, 497 P. 2d 564, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972). In Consumers Union
v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 18, 27 (D.D.C. 1973), the court
concluded: "The exclusion of Consumer Reports from accreditation to the periodical
galleries of the Senate and House violates the First and Fifth Amendments to the
Constitution."
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the National Collegiate Athletic Association rules committee, found
that there was no ground for appeal or complaint. "The final score
is all that counts," he said. "The game is played for the game -
there's a finality to it that makes it different from what we think of in
life day by day." But, as The New York Times commented editorially:
"The ideals of true sportsmanship would be better served if ... Miami
forfeited last week's game." '76 For the time being, we are apparently
in the outer reaches of due process.
V. RULES, REGULATIONS, AND RULINGS
Far greater than their roles as investigators and adjudicators is
the role of administrative and executive agencies and officials as
regulators and legislators. The Code of Federal Regulations occupies
three times as much shelf space as the United States Code. These
rules, regulations, and rulings control our lives. One questions whether
those affected by them should have any voice in their preparation and
promulgation.
Sections 553, 556, and 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act
677
provide a logical basis for the advent of this discussion. Section
553(b) - with exceptions that include interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, and rules of agency organization, procedure, and
practice - provides:
General notice of proposed rule making shall be published
in the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named
and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice
thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall include-
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public
rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the
rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule
or a description of the subjects and issues involved.67
Section 553(c) provides in pertinent part:
After notice required by this section, the agency shall give
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making
through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or
without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration
of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate
676. N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1972, at 32, col. 2.
677. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556, 557 (1970).
678. Id. § 553(b).
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in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis
and purpose. 7'
In contrast to section 553, sections 556 and 557 provide for an
adjudicative type hearing, and are applicable when a statute requires.
rules to be made on the record after an opportunity for an agency
hearing.
Two recent Supreme Court cases are illustrative of the significance
of the difference between the sections: United States v. Allegheny-
Ludlum Steel Corp.6 s0 involving two legislative type rules promul-
gated by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) which generally
required that unloaded freight cars be returned in the direction of
the owning railroad, and United States v. Florida East Coast Ry."81
dealing with ICC established incentive per diem rates for freight car
use. In both cases the Court held that written presentations under
section 553, rather than the adjudicatory type hearing under sections
556 and 557 sufficed. In Allegheny-Ludlum the Court reasoned:
Because the proceedings under review were an exercise of
legislative rulemaking power rather than adjudicatory hearings
the provisions of [sections] 556 and 557 were inapplicable.
This proceeding, therefore, was governed by the provisions
of [section 553] of the Administrative Procedure Act, requiring
basically that notice of proposed rulemaking shall be published
in the Federal Register, that after notice the agency give in-
terested persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking
through appropriate submissions, and that after consideration of
the record so made the agency shall incorporate in the rulep
adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.
The "Findings" and "Conclusions" embodied in the Commis-
sion's report fully comply with these requirements, and nothing
more was required by the Administrative Procedure Act."82
After the Supreme Court in Permian Basin Area Rate Cases6
8 3
encouraged the Federal Power Commission (FPC) in the use of
streamlined procedures, the FPC drastically changed its procedure,
in fixing just and reasonable rates for the sale of natural gas in inter-
state commerce, from the traditional method involving a trial type
adjudicatory proceeding to the rulemaking type, which section 553
679. Id. § 553(c).
680. 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
681. 410 U.S. 224 (1973). But cf. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. I (1938),
where the Court characterized an administrative proceeding in the Department of
Agricu ture for the purpose of fixing maximum rates to be charged by commission
men as "quasi-judicial" in nature which required a "full hearing." Id. at 14-15.
682. 406 U.S. at 757-58 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). For proceedings
involving adjudicatory hearings, see Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33
(1950), and Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937).
683. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
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envisions. The Tenth Circuit in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC68 4
approved the new procedure, stating that informal proceedings are
generally sufficient where hearings involve "quasi-legislative rather
than quasi-judicial activities."6"5
A good example of a commission that will issue many rules,
regulations, and rulings is the new Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission.6"6  The Commission, with certain exceptions, will regulate
the safety features of nearly all products sold to, or used by, consumers.
Existing functions dealing with flammable fabrics, hazardous sub-
stances, toys, refrigerators, and poison prevention packaging are to
be transferred to the new Commission. The Consumer Product Safety
Act 68 7 provides that proposed consumer product safety rules shall
be promulgated:
pursuant to section 553 of Title 5, except that the Commission
shall give interested persons an opportunity for the oral presenta-
tion of data, views, or arguments, in addition to an opportunity
to make written submissions. A transcript shall be kept of any
oral presentation.
0 8 8
A prime example of executive and administrative agencies and
officials issuing rulings which are in effect legislation can be seen in
the regulation of tobacco and its use. At different times three agencies
have been involved: the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC), and the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB).
In 1964, the FTC issued what it-designated as a Trade Commission
Rule, stating in part:
[I]t is an unfair or deceptive act or practice within. the meaning
of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to fail to dis-
684. 475 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1973).
685. Id. at 852.
686. The Commission was created in October 1972 by the Consumer Product Safety
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2051-81 (Supp. II, 1972).
687. Id.
688. Id. at § 2058(a) (2).
Circuit Judge Carl E. McGowan of the District of Columbia Circuit has sug-
gested that the police develop their own administrative rules of procedure. McGowan,
Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MicH. L. REv. 659 (1972). The Judge considered:
The important thing is that there be movement towards a system in which the
police are obliged to embody their operational policy determinations in formal
rules for all to see. That way lies a chance to achieve both greater freedom from
oppression for the individual and greater security for society.
Id. at 676. Judge McGowan further explained:
What is contemplated is that the police, in the classic tradition of administrative
law, have a larger share in devising the rules for the governance of their own
conduct in the first instance, with ultimate amenability to the commands of
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close, clearly and prominently, in all advertising and on every
pack, box, carton or other container in which cigarettes are sold
to the consuming public that cigarette smoking is dangerous to
health and may cause death from cancer and other diseases."'
But one year later, Congress enacted the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act6"' which required cigarette packages to bear the
milder statement: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to
Your Health."'6 91 The Act further provided: "No statement relating
to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section
1333 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette package.
'"6 92
Subsequently, the FCC issued a ruling requiring radio and tele-
vision stations which carry cigarette advertising to devote a significant
amount of broadcast time to presenting the case against cigarette
smoking. 693 The District of Columbia Circuit in Banzhaf v. FCC69" '
affirmed the ruling, and the Supreme Court denied review.
Next, Ralph Nader brought a proceeding to review the refusal of
the Federal Aviation Administrator to impose an emergency ban on
smoking on commercial aircraft. The court in Nader v. Federal Avia-
tion Administration695 denied review, but stated in a footnote: "The
freedom to smoke may have to give way to the freedom of others to
be unannoyed by smoke but that is not a safety problem." 696
In May 1973 the CAB adopted what it termed an economic regu-
lation, effective July 10, 1973,697 which required certified air carriers
to: ". . . provide a 'no-smoking" area or areas for each class of service
and for charter service . . . [and to establish procedures] which shall
insure that a sufficient number of seats in the 'no-smoking' areas of
the aircraft are available to accommodate persons who wish to be
seated in such areas.
'698
Recently a fourth federal agency, the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, entered the picture. The Commission's chairman, Richard
0. Simpson, indicated that a ban on the sale of cigarettes containing
689. 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8325 (1964) (rescinded 1965) (citation omitted).
.690. Act of July 25, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, §§ 2-9, 79 Stat. 282, as amended
15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1970).
691. Id. § 4, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970). The statement now required is:
"Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dan-
gerous To Your Health." 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970).
692. Act of July 25, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 5(a), 79 Stat. 283, as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1970).
693. Television Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967).
694. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
695. 440 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
696. Id. at 295 n.4.
697. 38 Fed. Reg. 12210 (1973).
698. Id.
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a higher percentage of tar and nicotine than that allowable by Com-
mission rulings, would be sought! 99
Another instance of a legislative type ruling by an administrative
agency that has produced two Supreme Court decisions is the FCC's
"fairness doctrine,"700 which requires that in the discussion of public
issues over the air each side of those issues be given fair coverage.
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,7°1 the Court sustained the
FCC's position in a case involving a personal attack. The Rev. Billy
James Hargis had attacked Fred J. Cook as a Leftist. When Cook
heard of the broadcast he concluded that he had been personally attacked
and demanded free reply time, which the station refused. The FCC
ruled that the station had to provide reply time, whether or not Cook
would pay for it. The Court held:
In view of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Govern-
ment's role in allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate
claims of those unable without governmental assistance to gain
access to those frequencies for expression of their views, we hold
the regulations and ruling at issue here are both authorized by
statute and constitutional.70 2
However, in Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Na-
tional Committee70 3 the Court, again sustaining the FCC's position,
held that neither the Federal Communications Act nor the first amend-
ment required broadcasters to accept paid editorial advertisements.
The case arose from separate unsuccessful efforts of the Democratic
National Committee and the Business Executives' Move for Vietnam
Peace to persuade broadcasters to sell them air time to present their
views. Both charged limitations of their constitutional right of free
speech. The FCC took the position that a broadcaster who meets his
public obligation to provide full and fair coverage of public issues is
not required to accept editorial advertisements. The Court agreed.
In another recent case, International Harvester Co. v. Ruckels-
haus,704 petitioners - International Harvester and the three major
auto companies - sought review of a decision by the administrator
699. See Gold, Cigarette Ban To Be Asked by Federal Safety Official, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 23, 1973, at 1, cols. 6-7.
700. The "fairness doctrine" evolved from a long history of FCC rulings; see,
e.g., Young Peoples' Ass'n for the Propogation of the Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178 (1938).
701. 395 U.S. 367 (1969); cf. Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473
F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973).
702. 395 U.S. at 400-01.
703. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). For an account of the argument in the Supreme Court,
see 41 U.S.L.W. 3217 (Oct. 24, 1972). In National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC,
482 F.2d 672, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court held that "the Federal Trade Commis-
sion is authorized to promulgate rules defining the meaning of the statutory standards
of the illegality the Commission is empowered to prevent."
704. 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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of the Environmental Protection Agency denying their applications,
filed pursuant to section 202 of the Clean Air Act,7 5 for 1-year suspen-
sions of the 1975 emission standards prescribed under the Act for
light duty vehicles. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for
further proceedings because the vehicle manufacturers had shown by
a preponderance of the record evidence that technology was not avail-
able within the meaning of the Clean Air Act to meet the standards
of 1975, and because the administrator had not given a sufficiently
reasoned presentation of the reliability of his prediction, based on his
methodology, to the contrary. The court reasoned:
In approaching our judicial task we conclude that the requirement
of a "reasoned decision" by the Environmental Protection Agency
means, in present context, a reasoned presentation of the relia-
bility of a prediction and methodology that is relied upon to
overcome a conclusion, of lack of available technology, supported
prima faciely by the only actual and observed data available, the
manufacturers' testing.700
Chief Judge Bazelon, who would not go as far as the majority as to
what was required of the administrative agency in the way of due
process, nevertheless stated:
I cannot believe that Congress intended this court to delve
into the substance of the mechanical, statistical, and technological
disputes in this case. Senator Cooper, the author of the judicial
review provision, stated repeatedly that this court's role would be
to "determine the question of due process." Thus the court's
proper role is to see to it that the agency provides "a framework
for principled decision making." Such a framework necessarily
includes the right of interested parties to confront the agency's
decision and the requirement that the agency set forth with
clarity the grounds for its rejection of opposing views.7" 7
The majority went so far as to suggest that "in the interest of pro-
viding a reasoned decision, the remand proceeding will involve some
opportunity for cross-examination.""7 8
Further illustrations of administrative rulings involved in court
proceedings are legion. On one day alone, June 18, 1973, the Court
handed down no less than six decisions involving the rulings of
administrative agencies: four involving rulings, of the Food and Drug
Administration in its effort to keep ineffective drugs off the market, 709
705. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-l(b) (5) (B) (1970).
706. 478 F.2d at 648.
707. Id. at 651.
708. Id. at 649 (footnotes omitted).
709. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973);
Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, 412 U.S. 645 (1973); CIBA Corp. v. Wein-
berger, 412 U.S. 640 (1973); USV Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S.
655 (1973).
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and two involving rate rulings of the ICC." ° In the main the Court
sustained the position of the agencies, although in one case it remanded
to the agency because the agency had not adequately explained the
basis for its judgment,71' and in another considered that a drug manu-
facturer had made a sufficient submission to warrant a hearing.
712
However, there have been decisions where the rules and regula-
tions of the administrative agencies have not prevailed. One example is
Milnot Co. v. Richardson."' The plaintiff company in that case
produced Milnot, a food product which is a blend of fat-free milk and
vegetable soya oil to which vitamins A and D are added. Milnot is
low in cholesterol. In 1923, Congress passed the Filled Milk Act'14
which prohibited the interstate shipment of filled milk products.
Following the enactment of that statute, the plaintiff, then known as
Carolene Products Company, shipped the prohibited products and was
convicted. After extensive litigation, the United States Supreme Court
twice upheld the validity of the statute. 7"5 After the affirmance of its
*second conviction, the company limited its distribution of Milnot to
intrastate commerce in the several states in which it was produced.
Circumstances then changed, including new knowledge about
cholesterol. A number of new food products appeared on the market
in competition with Milnot, which the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare permitted to be shipped in interstate commerce. The
Milnot Company again wanted to ship its product in interstate com-
merce. In 1972, the district court ruled in its favor, saying:
This court limits its decision to the conclusion, as a matter of law,
that the Filled Milk Act, as applied to prohibit interstate shipment
of Milnot, deprives the plaintiff of due process of law and pro-
vides no rational means for the achievement of any announced
objective of the Act.
716
710. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800
(1973); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
711. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S.
,800 (1973).
712. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973).
713. 350 F. Supp. 221 (S.D. Ill. 1972).
714. Act of March 4, 1923, ch. 262, §§ 1-4, 42 Stat. 1486-87 (codified at 21
U.S.C. §§ 61-64) (1970).
715. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 323 U.S. 18 (1944). The owner of the company, Charles
Hauser, even spent a weekend in jail before President Franklin Roosevelt par-
doned him.
716. 350 F. Supp. at 225. See also Lyons, Half Century After Congress Curbed
'Filled Milk' Court Vindicates Illinois Dairyman Who Fought The Ban, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 24, 1973, at 27, cols. 1-8.
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Another example of an* instance in which the agency's position has
not prevailed is Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 17 wherein the Second
Circuit held that when the National Labor Relations Board wanted to
effect a change in its long standing position that buyers are managerial
employees excluded from the protection of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, it had to do so in the form of a legislative type ruling
that conformed to the requirements of section 553 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.7 18  Chief Judge Friendly wrote for the court:
This is an appropriate case in which to give effect to the Supreme
Court's observation in the second Chenery decision, largely dis-
regarded by the Board for a quarter century:
The function of filling in the interstices of the Act should
be performed, as must [sic] as possible, through this quasi-
legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future.
Although policy-making by adjudication often cannot
be avoided in unfair labor practice cases, since the parties have
already acted and the Board must decide one way or the other,
there is no such problem in a representation case. Finally, the
argument for rule-making is especially strong when the Board
is proposing to reverse a long-standing and oft-repeated policy
on which industry and labor have relied. . . . The point rather
is that when the Board has so long been committed to a position,
it should be particularly sure that it has all available information
before adopting another, in a setting where nothing stands in
the way of a rule-making proceeding except the Board's con-
genital disinclination to follow a procedure which, as said in
Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, "enables the agency promulgating the rule
to educate itself before establishing rules and procedures which
have a substantial impact on those regulated," despite the Court's
pointed admonitions." 9
As a final example, one can look to Hou Ching Chow v. Attorney
General,720 wherein the court held that the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service could not revoke an administrative regulation that ex-
empted alien students seeking immigrant visas from the labor certifica-
tion requirements applicable to other aliens, without following the
relevant rule-making provisions." 1
717. 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973).
718. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). See notes 677-82 and accompanying text supra.
719. 475 F.2d at 495, 496-97 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
720. 362 F. Supp. 1288 (D.D.C. 1973).
721. Id. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
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The writer is loathe to close his account of the activities and
actions of administrative and executive agencies and officials to which
the courts should apply due process concepts without a reference to
legislative investigations. Four Supreme Court cases extending over
nearly a century have established that such investigations are subject
to constitutional limitations. In Kilbourn v. Thompson722 the Court
held that a legislative investigation into individual affairs was invalid
and unrelated to any legislative purpose. United States v. Rumely
72 1
made it plain that the mere semblance of a legislative purpose would
not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. Watkins v.
United States'14 involved John T. Watkins, a labor organizer who
was subpoenaed to appear before a subcommittee of the House Com-
mittee on Un-American Activities and who refused to tell whether
he knew certain persons to be members of the Communist Party.
He explained to the subcommittee why he took such a position:
I am not going to plead the fifth amendment, but I refuse
to answer certain questions that I believe are outside the proper
scope of your committee's activities. I will answer any questions
which this committee puts to me about myself. I will also answer
questions about those persons whom I knew to be members of
the Communist Party and whom I believe still are. I will not,
however, answer any questions with respect to others with whom
I associated in the past. I do not believe that any law in this
country requires me to testify about persons who may in the past
have been Communist Party members or otherwise engaged in
Communist Party activity but who to my best knowledge and
belief have long since removed themselves from the Communist
movement.
I do not believe that such questions are relevant to the work
of this committee nor do I believe that this committee has the
right to undertake the public exposure of persons because of their
past activities. I may be wrong, and the committee may have
this power, but until and unless a court of law so holds and directs
me to answer, I most firmly refuse to discuss the political activities
of my past associates.72 5
The Chairman of the subcommittee explained that the subcommittee
was investigating subversion and subversive propaganda and would
report to the House of Representatives for the purpose of remedial
legislation. Watkins refused to change his position and was convicted
722. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
723. 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
724. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
725. Id. at 185.
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of contempt of Congress. The Court upset the conviction. Chief
Justice Warren, in the Court's opinion, explained:
Unless the subject matter has been made to appear with undis-
putable clarity, it is the duty of the investigative body, upon
objection of the witness on the grounds of pertinency, to state
for the record the subject under inquiry at that time and the
manner in which the propounded questions are pertinent thereto.
To be meaningful, the explanation must describe what the topic
under inquiry is and the connective reasoning whereby the precise
questions asked relate to it.
The statement of the Committee Chairman in this case, in
response to petitioner's protest, was woefully inadequate to convey
sufficient information as to the pertinency of the questions to
the subject under inquiry. Petitioner was thus not accorded a
fair opportunity to determine whether he was within his rights
in refusing to answer, and his conviction is necessarily invalid
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
72 6
Groppi v. Leslie727 dealt with an attempt by the Wisconsin
assembly to imprison Milwaukee's protesting priest, the Rev. James E.
Groppi, by ex parte resolution under its contempt power, two days
after alleged contemptuous conduct, without giving him notice of the
charge against him or an opportunity to be heard. The Court held
that it could not be done, stating, through Chief Justice Burger:
We find little in our past decisions that would shed light on the
precise problem, but nothing to give warrant to the summary
procedure employed here, coming as it did two days after the
contempt. Indeed, we have stated time and again that reasonable
notice of a charge and an opportunity to be heard in defense
before punishment is imposed are "basic in our system of juris-
prudence."' 2 s
VII. CONCLUSION
The writer, from sources including his own experience and
,research, has catalogued the activities and actions of administrative
:and executive agencies to which the courts have been, and should be,
-applying due process concepts. The reader can add to the list from
'his own experience.
It is to the English, under Henry II (1154-1189), that we can
directly trace the development of individual rights and the concomitant
.concept of fundamental fairness that we call due process of law. We
* should strive to make the application of due process a hallmark of
the vitality of our government and our civilization. Indeed, a high
726. Id. at 214-15 (footnotes omitted).
727. 404 U.S. 496 (1972).
728. Id. at 502 (citations omitted). See Graham, High Court Curbs Contempt
!Power, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1972, at 19, col. 1.
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tribute may be paid to the concept of due process by noting that it
was an admired characteristic of one of the greatest flowerings of
Western Civilization - the Periclean Age of Greece.
Although our due process is not inherited directly from the
Greeks, it is profitable to view, with the perspective of history, Periclean
Greece and note that the names of the immortals of that age are
associated with the values we must strive to protect today. One will
find the ideas of the rule of law, fairness, and human freedom expressed
by the historians Herodotus and Thucydides, by the dramatists Ae-
schylus and Euripides, and by the playwright Aristophanes.
The best statement of Athenian democracy is attributed to
Pericles himself in his famed funeral oration delivered in honor of
the first Athenians to die in the 30-year struggle with Sparta. The
speech reminds the writer of Mr. Justice Brandeis as well as President
Lincoln. Pericles stated:
Our constitution is named a democracy, because it is in the hands
not of the few but of the many. But our laws secure equal
justice for all in their private disputes, and our public opinion
welcomes and honours talent in every branch of achievement, not
for any sectional reason but on grounds of excellence alone. And
as we give free play to all in our public life, so we carry the
same spirit into our daily relations with one another. We have
no black looks or angry words for our neighbour if he enjoys
himself in his own way, and we abstain from the little acts of
churlishness which, though they leave no mark, yet cause annoy-
ance to who so notes them. Open and friendly in our private
intercourse, in our public acts we keep strictly within the control
of law. We acknowledge the restraint of reverence; we are obedient
to whomsoever is set in authority, and to the laws, more
especially to those which offer protection to the oppressed and
those unwritten ordinances whose transgressions bring admitted
shame.
729
The emphasis placed upon the meritorious respect for individual
freedom and the fair application of the rule of law is coupled with a
high respect for authority and law. One cannot be present without
the other.
As noted, our own concept of due process has been in a continuous
state of development since the time of Henry II of England. Today
the bench and bar are applying this concept to the activities and actions,
of executive and administrative agencies and their officials to the end
that the individual may have a greater assurance that he will obtain
equal, reasoned justice under the law.
729. THUCYDIDES, bk. II, ch. 37 (R. Livingstone transl. 1943).
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APPENDIX
IV. Recent cases dealing with the due process rights of probationers and parolees.
Lane v. Attorney General, 477 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1973) (since the federal
government permits retained counsel at parole revocation hearings it must provide
counsel for indigent parolees at such hearings); Cottle v. Wainwright, 477 F.2d 269
(5th Cir.), vacated, 414 U.S. 895 (1973) (since Florida statute provided that a parolee
may be represented by counsel at his parole revocation hearing, the court concluded:
"We are of the view that inasmuch as such assistance is, by statute, available to those
who can afford it, it should likewise be available to those who cannot." 477 F.2d at
271) ; Valdez v. Perini, 474 F.2d 19 (6th Cir. 1973) (Morrissey does not apply retro-
actively) ; Van Blaricom v. Forscht, 473 F.2d 1323 (5th Cir. 1973) (Morrissey applies
to federal parolees. "The minimum standards of constitutional due process imposed on
the federal Board of Parole are certainly no less than those imposed on State Boards of
Parole." Id. at 1328) ; Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1972) (federal parole
board revocation hearing was fundamentally unfair in that the board relied upon a
synopsis of a state parole violation report which was apparently based on statements
by several confidential informants without questioning the informants themselves);
United States ex rel. Martinez v. Alldredge, 468 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1972) ("Our
research discloses no court of appeals decision holding that appointed counsel for
indigents is constitutionally required at a mandatory release revocation hearing at
which the factual grounds for revocation are uncontroverted." Id. at 685); Baxter
v. Davis, 450 F.2d 459 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 999 (1972) (where parole
violations had been clearly proven, due process did not require prerevocation ad-
versary hearing).
Anderson v. Nelson, 352 F. Supp. 1124 (N.D. Cal. 1972) ("Because of the
loss of liberty that results from the determination of a sentence, a deprivation like
an additional criminal sanction, the court concludes that due process applies." Id. at
1128); Myers v. Bendus, 343 F. Supp. 370 (E.D. Pa. 1972) ("Federal law does not
appear to require that a state prisoner be represented by counsel at state parole
proceedings." Id. at 371) ; Mozingo v. Craven, 341 F. Supp. 296 (C.D. Cal. 1972)
(in the circumstances of this case parolee had a due process right to counsel at a
parole revocation hearing); Bransted v. Schmidt, 324 F. Supp. 1232 (W.D. Wis.
1971) ("Therefore, I hold that due process requires that prior to parole revocation
a hearing must be held at which a parolee may have a reasonable opportunity to
explain away the accusation that he has violated the conditions upon which his
parole was granted." Id. at 1236) ; Goolsby v. Gagnon, 322 F. Supp. 460 (E.D.
Wis. 1971) ("The value and necessity of counsel in representing the interests of the
person facing revocation is the same whether he be a probationer or a parolee." Id.
at 467) ; Laquay v. State, 16 Md. App. 709, 299 A.2d 527 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973)
("We are constrained to conclude that as to the inquiry whether conditions of
probation were violated as here conducted, due process was affronted, in that, for
lack of counsel appellant was at such a disadvantage that an ingredient of unfairness
actively operated in the process leading to the revocation of her probation." Id. at
535); Perry v. Williard, 247 Ore. 145, 427 P.2d 1020 (1967) (revocation of pro-
bation) ("We now hold that counsel is not only desirable but is so essential to a
fair and trustworthy hearing that due process of law when liberty is at stake includes
a right to counsel." Id. at 149, 427 P.2d at 1022).
In Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430 (1973), the Court reversed a Missouri court
decision that revoked the probation of a truck driver for failing to report as an arrest
a traffic citation. The Court concluded per curiam that the revocation decision "was
so totally devoid of evidentiary support as to be invalid under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 432.
The conditions attached to the grant of probation or release on parole are varied
and many. In United States v. Manfredonia, 341 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd,
459 F.2d 1392 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972), the district court revoked
probation because of the defendant's refusal to submit monthly reports. However, in
United States v. Wilson, 469 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1972), the Second Circuit vacated a
district court's judgment of revocation of probation that was based on the ground
that the probationer had "wilfully" violated the special condition of his probation that
lie pay all alimony and support assessments then owing by him to his estranged
wife and make such further alimony payments as the New York City Family Court
might order. 74
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In Morgan v. Wofford, 472 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1973), the probationer was ordered
to pay $7,000 restitution to the victim in weekly installments of $35 a week, but the
$7,000 figure was determined by the probation office rather than the sentencing judge.
The Fifth Circuit found a due process violation, saying, after referring to Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1971): "A fortiori, prior notice and an opportunity to be
heard are prerequisite where $7,000 is ordered by a court of law to be paid out of
appellant's weekly salary and the penalty for failure to pay is imprisonment." Id.
at 827.
In Sigler v. Berrigan, 410 U.S. 902 (1973), the Court granted a stay to the
United States Board of Parole to prevent the brothers Daniel J. and Philip F.
Berrigan, the antiwar priests, from traveling to North Vietnam. Justice Douglas
dissented: "I would allow the respondents their constitutional right to travel." Id.
at 903. The District of Columbia Circuit had given the Berrigans relief. Berrigan
v. Sigler, 475 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Subsequently, in Berrigan v. Sigler, 358 F.
Supp. 130 (D.D.C. 1973), the district court sustained the position of the Board of
Parole. But cf. McGregor v. Schmidt, 358 F. Supp. 1131 (W.D. Wis. 1973) (right
of parolee to be paroled to another state absent compelling state interest).
V. Recent cases involving the due process rights of prisoners.
Lindsay v. Mitchell, 455 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1972) ("While forfeiture of good-
time credit is a function which addresses itself to prison administration, subject to
supervision by the Attorney General of the United States, . . . an alleged abuse of
that function constitutes proper grounds for federal judicial review." Id. at 918);
Andrade v. Hauck, 452 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1971) (assertion that prisoner was de-
prived of his commissary privileges by his jailers in retaliation for writing to a
federal judge required a hearing) ; Allison v. Wilson, 434 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971) (allegations of physical abuse by prison guards
stated a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act); Dearman v. Woodson, 429
F.2d 1288 (10th Cir. 1970) (refusal to provide food for a period of 50'A hours stated
a cause of action); Wiltsie v. California Dep't of Corrections, 406 F.2d 515 (9th
Cir. 1968) (allegation of unjustifiable beating of a prisoner stated a cause of action) ;
Brown v. Brown, 368 F.2d 992 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 868 (1966)
(beating of a prisoner without cause stated a cause of action).
Holt v. Moore, 357 F. Supp. 1102 (W.D.N.C. 1973) (increased state punish-
ment as the result of a filing of a federal detainer violated due process); Sands v.
Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. Fla. 1973) ("This court holds that in the
prison disciplinary context an inmate has the right to be heard and the right to
support his contentions with evidence." Id. at 1087) ; Mabra v. Schmidt, 356 F. Supp.
620 (W.D. Wis. 1973) (motion to dismiss complaint of prisoner in segregation who
was denied visits by his two- and three-year-old children denied); Carlisle v.
Bensinger, 355 F. Supp. 1359 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (failure of state official to follow a
state regulation providing for a hearing within 72 hours after a disciplinary ticket
is written did not violate due process) ; Griggs v. Liethliter, 355 F. Supp. 1121
(N.D. Ill. 1973) (in a disciplinary proceeding, due process did not require a con-
frontation and cross-examination); Black v. Brown, 355 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Ill.
1973) (ameliorative prison regulation need not be applied retroactively) ("[fludicial
economy necessitates that the ever-changing concept of what due process encom-
passes be applied prospectively only." Id. at 927); Smith v. North Carolina, 355 F.
Supp. 217 (W.D.N.C. 1973) ("Extending or increasing punishment because an
inmate successfully petitioned a court is an unconstitutional denial of his right to
unhampered access to the courts." Id. at 219) ; Castor v. Mitchell, 355 F. Supp. 123
(W.D.N.C. 1973) ("The defendants put Castor in punitive segregation and otherwise
punished him because he started a suit complaining of his prison treatment. This will
not do." Id. at 125); Collins v. Hancock, 354 F. Supp. 1253 (D.N.H. 1973) (due
process requires a "hearing before an impartial tribunal. This means that a prison
official who has participated in the investigation of the offense cannot be a member
of the hearing tribunal." Id. at 1258-59); United States ex rel. Nelson v. Twomey,
354 F. Supp. 1151 (N.D. I1. 1973) (institutional lockup did not violate due process
when imposed in response to a real threat to prison security and limited to a reason-
able period of time); Allen v. Nelson, 354 F. Supp. 505 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (prisoner's
continued solitary confinement after the basis for confinement has ended, without
notice or a hearing to permit a challenge to that status, violated due process) ; Inmates
of Milwaukee County Jail v. Petersen, 353 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (pretrial
detainees entitled to an effective but informal hearing in administrative disciplinary
hearings and retain the same due process rights as arrestees freed on bail); Bowers
v. Smith, 353 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Vt. 1972) (classification of prisoner as a security 75
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risk based solely on a history of past escapes cannot be used to deprive an inmate of
his due process rights); Lamar v. Coffield, 353 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D. Tex. 1972)
(curtailment of prisoner's speech in mess hall, corridors, and during performance of'
his duties may be justified on the grounds of disciplinary necessity); Holland v.
Oliver, 350 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Va. 1972) (written notice of charges one hour before-
hearing did not afford inmate "his full constitutional due." Id. at 487); Ferrell v.
Huffman, 350 F. Supp. 164 (E.D. Va. 1972) (denial of highest honor status for
prisoner is not violative of due process unless arbitrary or capricious) ; Colligan v.
United States, 349 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (before being placed in segrega-
tion a prisoner is entitled to: (1) a neutral and detached hearing board; (2) written'
notice of the charges; (3) the opportunity to confront the evidence against him; (4)
a right to summon his own witness; (5) the right to testify in his own behalf if he-
chooses; (6) opportunity to obtain inmate or staff counsel-substitute; and (7) a
written decision based solely upon the evidence presented) ; Meyers v. Alldredge, 348.
F. Supp. 807 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (forfeiture of good time and segregation not dispro-
portionate to offenses); Stewart v. Jozwiak, 346 F. Supp. 1062 (E.D. Wis. 1972)
(a prisoner charged with misconduct is entitled to reasonable advance notice of
charges, a hearing before a neutral hearing officer, the right to confront and question
accusers, to present witnesses, and a reasoned decision) ; United States ex rel. Neal
v. Wolfe, 346 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (demotional disciplinary transfer of
state prisoner from one institution to another within the state correctional system,
accompanied by isolation without hearing is denial of due process); Krause v.
Schmidt, 341 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Wis. 1972) (inmates facing "grievious loss" by
transfer entitled to minimum procedural due process safeguards) ; Lathrop v.
Brewer, 340 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Iowa 1972) ("[I]n the federal context the basic
rights that must be afforded are those that will at least give a prisoner ample notice
of the pendency of a disciplinary proceeding and the nature of the infraction with
which he is charged, a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the issue, and an
impartial tribunal basing its decision on an unbiased record." Id. at 880) ; United
States ex rel. Colen v. Norton, 335 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Conn. 1972) ("While it is
settled law that the grant or denial of good-time credits rests within the sound dis-
cretion of the penal authorities, it also has been emphasized that judicial intervention
is warranted if that discretion is abused by a disregard of the rules, regulations and
policies of the Bureau of Prisons." Id. at 1317) ; United States ex rel. Walker v.
Mancusi, 338 F. Supp. 311 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 467 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1972)
("Rational inquiry in turn requires that the inmate be confronted with the accusation,
informed of the evidence against him and afforded a reasonable opportunity to explain
his actions." Id. at 318); Urbano v. McCorkle, 344 F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1971)
("This court is of the opinion that prisoners who are confined to administrative
segregation for the good of the institution should be entitled to the same minimal due
process that is already afforded prisoners who are confined to segregation for dis-
ciplinary infractions." Id. at 168) ; Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va.
1971) (prison disciplinary proceedings must comply with due process safeguards, in-
cluding notice in writing of the substance of the factual charge of misconduct) ; Rippen
v. Nickles, 332 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D. Va. 1971) ("The responsibility for running the
federal system is an executive function." Id. at 1235); Beishir v. Swenson, 331 F.
Supp. 1227 (W.D. Mo. 1971) (procedure applied was fundamentally fair under
conditions which bordered on riot); Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md.
1971) ("Adequate notice of charges in a substantial disciplinary proceeding is neces-
sary to afford a prisoner the opportunity to prepare a defense." Id. at 172); Meola
v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1971) (disciplinary punishments resulting
in substantial loss of good time or inability to earn good time require at least notice
of charges and an opportunity to reply to them) ; Wilson v. Garnett, 332 F. Supp. 889
(W.D. Mo. 1970) (prisoner may not be committed to a seclusion cell without adminis-
trative due process) ; Carter v. McGinnis, 320 F. Supp. 1092 (W.D.N.Y. 1970) ("If
the evidence against plaintiffs is so substantial as to justify confinement in segrega-
tion for a period now in excess of thirty days, it must in accordance with its own
rules and regulations present that evidence in a hearing with the inmate present."
Id. at 1097-98) ; Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (prison
officials permanently enjoined from placing inmate "in solitary confinement or strip-
ping him of good time without procedures complying with minimum constitutional
due process requirements." Id. at 1030) ; Kritsky v. McGinnis, 313 F. Supp. 1247
(N.D.N.Y. 1970) (summary hearing resulting in segregation and loss of good time
insufficient due process protection); Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I.
1970) (parties negotiated regulations governing disciplinary and classification pro-
cedures for inmates) ("Finally, it has been most seriously and most frequently
asserted that the Regulations will not be followed. This is simply riot so; these
Regulations establish rules of law which must be followed." Id. at 861).
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One of the cases which held that state prisoners could maintain their federal
.actions under the Civil Rights Act before exhausting state court remedies, Rodriguez
v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Oswald v. Rodriguez,
407 U.S. 919 (1972), was argued in the Supreme Court in January 1973. 41 U.S.LW.
.3390 (Jan. 16, 1973). The Court reversed sub nom. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475 (1973), on the ground that habeas corpus was the sole remedy: "[W]hen a
:state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment,
and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate or speedier
release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus."
Id. at 500).
A number of recent cases involve pre-trial detainees. See, e.g., Collins v. Schoon-
:field, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972); Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128
(N.D. Cal. 1972) ; Conklin v. Hancock, 344 F. Supp. 1119 (D.N.H. 1971) ; Hamilton
v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971) ("It is clear that the conditions for
pre-trial detention must not only be equal to, but superior to, those permitted for
prisoners serving sentences for the crimes they have committed against society."
Id. at 1191).
In Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), the Court held that a prisoner's pro se
-complaint for damages for alleged physical injuries and deprivation of rights in dis-
,ciplinary confinement should not have been dismissed without an evidentiary hearing.
Cases have gone different ways on the redetermination of a sentence. Compare
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), with Sturm v. California Adult Authority,
.395 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969). In Specht, where a
judge sentenced appellant under the Colorado Sex Offenders Act, which allowed
indeterminate sentence of from one day to life even though the specific statute under
which he was convicted carried a 10 year maximum sentence, the Court ruled that
.due process required that the defendant "be present with counsel, have an opportunity
to be heard, be confronted with witnesses against him, have the right to cross-
,examine, and to offer evidence of his own." Id. at 610. But in Sturm, where the
California Adult Authority redetermined the sentence from 6 to 102 years after the
.prisoner broke prison rules, the Ninth Circuit found no due process violation.
In an interesting case, Dreyer v. Jalet, 349 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Tex. 1972), three
-prisoners in the custody of the Texas Department of Correction sought injunctive
relief to bar Frances T. Freeman Jalet, a VISTA lawyer who had inmate clients,
from the prison system as a result of her alleged activities to organize and, in effect,
to instigate an uprising among the inmate population. The district court found in her
favor and made these observations about the prison system:
[T]he framework of prison regulations and procedures within which the inmate
must live his highly regimented life and serve his sentence must, above all, reflect
an evenhanded fairness in application at all levels of administrative disciplines....
With a lack of public awareness and an absence of independent outside checks
on prison methods, it certainly cannot be denied that the opportunity, at least,
has been present for a prison system to become a law unto itself. Once such a
-total institutionalization emerges, its very preservation depends upon the exercise
of unrestrained administrative discretion to control every facet of the lives
of its inmates.
One vital deterrent to such a situation is the maintenance of a viable adminis-
trative structure for the handling of inmate grievances.
Id. at 487-88.
VI. Recent cases involving a prisoner's right of access to counsel,
to an adequate law library, or to the courts.
Christman v. Skinner, 468 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1972) ("Sostre made it clear that
jail officials are not permitted to refuse to mail a communication between an inmate
and an attorney." Id. at 725-26); Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1972)
("Prisoners no less than other persons have a constitutional right of access to the
courts ... and prison authorities may neither place burdens on that right . .. nor
punish its exercise. . . " Id. at 253); McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.
1972) (court clerk's negligence which impeded filing of papers for post-conviction
relief stated a cause of action) ; Evans v. Moseley, 455 F.2d 1084 (10th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972) ("[Ifn the absence of the State providing some
reasonable alternatives, the State could not enforce a regulation barring inmates
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from furnishing legal assistance to other prisoners." Id. at 1087-88) ; Harris v.
Pate, 440 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1971) ("[A] prisoner's complaint based on interference
with his access to the courts states a claim for relief under the Civil Rights Act."
Id. at 317); Simmons v. Russell, 352 F. Supp. 572 (M.D. Pa. 1972) ("The policy
in effect in seclusion at Huntingdon restricting Court correspondence to cases with a
prescribed deadline was clearly unreasonable and completely impeded inmates from
either obtaining legal advice or access to the Courts. The practices in punitive
segregation of only allowing one letter per week to be mailed out similarly was
unreasonable and constitutionally unsupportable." Id. at 578-79) ; Hooks v. Wain-
wright, 352 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (the state has an affirmative constitutional
duty to furnish prison inmates with adequate law libraries) ; Lamar v. Kern, 349 F.
Supp. 222 (S.D. Tex. 1972) ("With regard to outgoing general mail, that is, non-
special mail, the inmate may write uncensored mail to anyone at his own expense
without restriction as to length or volume." Id. at 225. Incoming letters may be
opened by prison authorities but only in the presence of the inmate.); Guajardo v.
McAdams, 349 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (authorities enjoined from censoring
or opening mail from inmates of the Dallas County jail addressed to the courts,
prosecuting attorneys, probation and parole officers, governmental agencies, lawyers,
and the press) ; Wells v. McGinnis, 344 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("Channels
of communication between a prisoner and his counsel must be kept open." Id. at 596) ;
Van Ermen v. Schmidt, 343 F. Supp. 377 (W.D. Wis. 1972) (refusal to permit
prisoner to receive law books from any source but the publisher was an unreasonable
interference with prisoner's freedom to use the mails) ; McDonnell v. Wolff, 342 F.
Supp. 616 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 483 F.2d 1059 (8th Cir. 1973),
cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 913 (1974) (regulation allowing a total of approximately 7
hours a week for an inmate's independent legal research was unreasonable) ; Tyree v.
Fitzpatrick, 325 F. Supp. 554 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 445 F.2d 627 (1st Cir. 1971) ("[I]t
cannot be doubted that petitioner has a right to communicate freely with this court
and with his counsel .. " Id. at 558) ; People v. Wainwright, 325 F. Supp. 402
(M.D. Fla. 1971) (prison officials at Florida State Prison at Raiford enjoined from
opening, reading, or censoring correspondence between prisoners and counsel of
record) ; Marsh v. Moore, 325 F. Supp. 392 (D. Mass. 1971) (injunction granted
against consoring prisoner's correspondence with counsel) ; In re Jordan, 7 Cal. 3d
930, 500 P.2d 873, 103 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1972) (censoring prisoner's correspondence
with counsel enjoined).
VII. Recent cases involving prison conditions.
Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973) (state prison's involuntary injec-
tions of nauseating drugs to affect behavior violates eighth amendment) ; LaReau v.
MacDougall,'473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973) (con-
ditions "in the strip cell fall below the irreducible minimum of decency required by
the Eighth Amendment," 473 F.2d at 978) ; Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072 (6th Cir.
1972) ("Thus it is that fundamental fairness and our most basic conception of due
process mandate that medical care be provided to one who is incarcerated and may be
suffering from serious illness or injury." Id. at 1076) ; Antonio v. Barnes, 464 F.2d
584 (4th Cir. 1972) (allegation that solitary confinement quarters at Virginia State
Farm were unfit for human habitation) ; Anderson v. Nosser, 456 F.2d 835 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972) (participants in a civil rights march without a parade
permit in Natchez were arrested and crowded into the quarters for felons at Parch-
man State Penitentiary, processed as prisoners rather than detainees, made to take
laxatives with toilet paper in short supply, and some of the women were not supplied
with sanitary napkins) (verdict should have been directed against superintendent
under the Civil Rights Act for the "denial of due process of law through summary
punishment." Id. at 841); Woolsey v. Beto, 450 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1971) ("The
alleged imposition of unreasonable punitive work assignments and solitary confine-
ment with the deliberate and knowing effect of activating appellant's tubercular
condition states a cause of action .. " Id. at 321) ; Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d
921 (2d Cir. 1970) (deliberate indifference to a prisoner's condition states a cause
of action) ; Sinclair v. Henderson, 435 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1970) (allegations that
inmates were denied sunshine and exercise and were fed from filthy foodcarts,
required hearing and adjudication on the merits).
Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972) ("We hold that con-
finement of inmates at Parchman in barracks unfit for human habitation . . . [and
maintaining a] trusty system, which allows inmates to exercise unchecked authority
over other inmates, is patently impermissible." Id. at 894) ; Taylor v. Sterrett, 344
F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. 1972) ("This Coort recognizes that enlarging the jail will
be costly, but inadequate resources can never, be an adequate justification for the 78
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state's depriving any person of his constitutional rights." Id. at 422) ; Mayberry v.
Maroney, 337 F. Supp. 601 (W.D. Pa. 1971) ("[T]he physical abuses of the plaintiff
by the defendant asserts a deprivation of the plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 602-03); Schmitt
v. Crist, 333 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (complaint alleging that prison authori-
ties denied prisoner use of soap, toothbrush, and clean bedding and chained him to
a steel bed without food or water for two days stated a cause of action under the
Civil Rights Act) ; Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. La. 1971)
("Confinement for long periods of time without the opportunity for regular outdoor
exercise does as a matter of law, constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth Amendment . . . ." Id. at 1131); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp.
93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972) ("In any event, when the
total picture of confinement in the Lucas County Jail is examined, what appears is
confinement in overcrowded quarters, lightless, airless, damp and filthy with leaking
water and human wastes, slow starvation, deprivation of most human contacts, except
with others in the same sub-human state, no exercise or recreation, little if any
medical attention, no attempt at rehabilitation, and for those who in despair or
frustration lash out at their surroundings, confinement, stripped of clothing and
every last vestige of humanity, is a sort of oubliette." Id. at 99) ; Hamilton v.
Schiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970) ("Prison life inevitably involves some
deprivation of rights, but the conditions of plaintiffs' confinement in Orleans Parish
Prison so shock the conscience as a matter of elemental decency and are so much
more cruel than is necessary to achieve a legitimate penal aim that such confinement
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution." Id. at 1019) ; Hancock v. Avery,
301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969) (solitary confinement under animal-like con-
ditions violated the eighth amendment) ; Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D.
Cal. 1966) (unjustifiable conditions in solitary confinement constituted eighth amend-
ment violation). The federal government announced through Donald E. Santerelli,
administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, a ban on the use of
federal anticrime money for psychosurgery, medical research, and chemotherapy for
prison inmates, juvenile offenders, and alcoholics. See Oelsner, U.S. Bars Crime
Fund Use on Behavior Modification, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1974, at 54, col. 1.
VIII. Recent cases involving welfare recipients.
New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973) (work
incentive program provisions of Social Security Act do not preempt the New York
work rules of the New York Social Welfare Law for persons participating in AFDC
programs) ; Daniel v. Goliday, 398 U.S. 73 (1970) (district court to determine on
the basis of the record made by the parties whether reduction of benefits need be
preceded by a pre-reduction hearing) ; Doe v. Gillman, 479 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1973)
(Iowa statute disallowing AFDC payments in absence of a certification that parent
receiving aid is helping to obtain support money for children from persons legally
responsible held invalid) ; Wilson v. Dietz, 456 F.2d 314 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 928 (1972) (recipients of AFDC need not be kept on rolls until termination
decision becomes final and unappealable); Merriweather v. Burson, 439 F.2d 1092
(5th Cir. 1971) (district court to determine on the basis of the record made by the
parties whether reduction of benefits need be preceded by a pre-reduction hearing) ;
Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973) (unwed mother may be required to
disclose the name of the child's putative father and to institute a paternity action);
Glover v. McMurray, 361 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (decision to close publicly
funded day-care center triggered hearing procedures of Social Security Act) ; Wilson
v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (Illinois practice of denying AFDC
benefits to unborn children contravenes Social Security Act and thus is illegal under
the supremacy clause); Majchszak v. Schmidt, 358 F. Supp. 1165 (E.D. Wis. 1973)
(Wisconsin's denial of AFDC benefits to wives whose husbands are incarcerated
prior to trial is in conflict with the standards of the federal Social Security Act);
Stewart v. Wohlgemuth, 355 F. Supp. 1212 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (regulation of the
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare which set up conclusive presumption
that fulltime college students did not meet employment requirements was without
rational basis and violative of due process) ; Boucher v. Minter, 349 F. Supp. 1240
(D. Mass. 1972) (automatic reclassification of family into group receiving no shelter
allowance upon mother's remarriage on basis of presumption that household expenses
will be paid by the stepfather, is unrealistic and arbitrary) ; Buena v. Juras, 349 F.
Supp. 91 (D. Ore. 1972) (suspension of welfare grants including AFDC matched
grants, during the farm harvest season could not be enforced to the extent that it was
inconsistent with the federal Work Incentive Program and applicable federal regu-
lations) ;' Serritella v. Engelman, 339 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1972) (plaintiffs who 79
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alleged that they had suffered either termination or reduction of welfare benefits
under federally aided programs by action of their county welfare boards without a
hearing were given preliminary injunctive relief); Hunt v. Edmunds, 328 F. Supp.
468 (D. Minn. 1971) (abrogation of shelter allowance required a prereduction notice
and chance to be heard); Meyers v. Juras, 327 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ore.), aff'd, 404
U.S. 803 (1971) (invalidated an Oregon regulation requiring local welfare adminis-
trators to terminate aid to families with dependent children if the mothers refused
to cooperate with law enforcement officials in obtaining financial support from non-
supporting fathers).
New York City has been winning 43 per cent of its claims to halt or reduce
grants to welfare clients after the required hearings. See N.Y. Times, July 16, 1973,
at 33, col. 1.
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